War and Spending Prerogatives:  Stages of Congressional Abdication by Fisher, Louis
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 19 
Number 1 Congress: Does It Abdicate Its 
Power? (Vol. XIX, No. 1) 
Article 4 
2000 
War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional 
Abdication 
Louis Fisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fisher, Louis (2000) "War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdication," Saint Louis 
University Public Law Review: Vol. 19 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
7 
WAR AND SPENDING PREROGATIVES:  STAGES OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION 
LOUIS FISHER* 
From 1789 to World War II, the power to make war and decide spending 
priorities remained essentially where the framers placed it: with Congress.  Since 
1950, both powers have moved toward the President, slowly at first but more 
rapidly in recent decades.  The War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 were billed as 
efforts by Congress to recapture its place as a coequal branch.  Yet the War 
Powers Resolution marked an abject surrender of legislative prerogatives to the 
President, and the budget reform statute of 1974 played into the hands of 
Presidents and undermined Congress as a representative institution.  So swift has 
been this transformation that it threatens core values of democracy and self-
government. 
The record of abdication of war powers has been particularly blatant.  There 
should be little doubt about the precipitous decline of Congress in this area.  The 
scope of abdication of spending powers has been less, but any loss of power so 
identified with Congress merits concern and attention.  Whatever differences one 
might have on these patterns of abdication, one fact seems indisputable.  The 
framers’ belief that each branch would protect its prerogatives and give energy to 
the system of checks and balances has failed spectacularly since 1950.  Faced 
with executive encroachment, Congress does not protect its institutional powers.  
It also voluntarily gives them away. 
Why should citizens care about this institutional decline?  If Congress wants 
to play second fiddle to the President, why offer any objection?  The reason is 
that larger interests are at stake.  Rights and liberties are protected by structural 
safeguards and the full play of checks and balances, not just by an independent 
judiciary.  What we are witnessing, therefore, is a fundamental failure of our 
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This article builds on a paper I presented at a symposium held at the Saint Louis University Law 
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constitutional system, a failure that necessarily jeopardizes individual rights 
along with legislative prerogatives. 
These trends should not be confused with the quite different issue of 
delegation.  From the First Congress to the present, lawmakers have found it 
necessary to transfer to the executive branch discretionary authority over 
spending, tariffs, economic regulation, and other national powers.  From the 
start, legislation by Congress has always depended on other branches to “fill up 
the details.”1  Abdication—transferring to others what belongs to you—is a 
unique category with profound constitutional implications. 
I. WHAT THE FRAMERS EXPECTED 
In creating three separate branches, the framers expected that each branch 
would have the incentive to protect its prerogatives and fight off invasions from 
other branches.  In Federalist No. 51, James Madison argued that the secret to 
avoiding a concentration of power in a single branch was “in giving to those who 
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal 
motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to 
counter ambition.”2  Madison knew that it was not enough to simply create three 
separate branches of government on paper.  At the state level, despite language 
in the state constitutions carefully allocating power, legislatures had already 
begun to take power from the governor and the courts.3  Constitutional language 
in the states represented mere “parchment barriers.”4 
Madison concluded from this experience that separation of power would 
never survive unless there were “auxiliary precautions.”5  It was his goal to give 
to each branch “the means of keeping each other in the proper places.”6  Instead 
of an impracticable separation of power, he turned to an elaborate system of 
checks and balances to keep the branches strong and independent. 
Of the powers assigned to Congress, nothing was more fundamental than the 
power of the purse and the power to initiate war.  In Federalist No. 58, Madison 
called the power of the purse “the most complete and effectual weapon with 
which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for 
obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and 
salutary measure.”7  Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme Court from 1811 
to 1845, said that the power of declaring war “is not only the highest sovereign 
prerogative; . . . it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that 
 
 1. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
 2. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961). 
 3. Record by James Madison (July 17, 1887), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 25, 35 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
 4. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 48, at 343. 
 5. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 51, at 361. 
 6. Id. at 355. 
 7. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 58, at 391. 
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it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils 
of the nations.”8  By insisting on legislative control over the decision to go to 
war, the framers broke ranks with the models of government developed by John 
Locke and William Blackstone, who advocated executive control over foreign 
policy and decisions of war and peace.9 
At the Philadelphia Convention, the framers were explicit about rejecting 
Locke and Blackstone.  Charles Pinckney said he was for “a vigorous Executive 
but was afraid the Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend to 
peace & war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst 
kind, towit an elective one.”10  James Wilson agreed that “the Prerogatives of the 
British Monarch” were not a proper guide for the American Presidency.11  To 
George Mason, the whole purpose of vesting the war power in Congress and 
requiring legislative deliberation was “for clogging rather than facilitating 
war.”12  As Wilson explained at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, the 
system of checks and balances “will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to 
guard against.  It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of 
men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is 
vested in the legislature at large.”13 
Through the granting of letters of marque and reprisal, monarchs were able 
to authorize private citizens to wage war on other countries.  This method came 
to refer to any use of force short of a declared war.  Unlike Blackstone, who 
recognized that the king had the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, the 
framers transferred that responsibility to Congress and associated it with the 
power to declare war.  Thus, Article I gives to Congress the power to “declare 
war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures 
on Land and Water.”  Both general and limited wars were left to the discretion of 
the representative branch. 
In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson related marque and reprisal to 
the power to wage war.  The making of a reprisal on a nation, he said, “is a very 
serious thing . . . when reprisal follows, it is considered an act of war, & never 
yet failed to produce it in the case of a nation able to make war.”14  If it became 
 
 8. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 60 
(1833). 
 9. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 146-48 (Thomas P. Pearson 
ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 250-59 (1803). 
 10. Record by James Madison (June 1, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 3, at 64-5. 
 11. Id. at 65-66. 
 12. Record by James Madison (Aug. 17, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 3, at 314, 319. 
 13. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836-45). 
 14. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on “The Little Sarah” (May 16, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 257, 259 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). 
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necessary to invoke this power, “Congress must be called on to take it; the right 
of reprisal being expressly lodged with them by the constitution, & not with the 
executive.”15 
During the Quasi War against France, from 1798 to 1800, Congress 
authorized private citizens to provide vessels and other military assistance.  
Alexander Hamilton, always protective of executive power, recognized that the 
Constitution vested in Congress exclusive power over reprisals.16  In the midst of 
hostilities, the President could repel force by force, but any actions beyond those 
measures “must fall under the idea of reprisals & requires the sanction of that 
Department which is to declare or make war.”17 
Questions about framers’ intent invariably cause scholars to scatter and 
divide.  Not so with the war power.  There is remarkable agreement among 
experts on the war power that the framers vested in Congress the sole power to 
initiate hostilities against other nations.  Taylor Reveley wrote that if you could 
ask a man in the state of nature to read the war-power provisions in the 
Constitution and compare them to war-power practices after 1789, “he would 
marvel at how much Presidents have spun out of so little.  On its face, the text 
tilts decisively toward Congress.”18  To Charles Lofgren, the grants of power to 
Congress to declare war and to issue letters of marque and reprisal “likely 
convinced contemporaries even further that the new Congress would have nearly 
complete authority over the commencement of war.”19  John Hart Ely noted that 
when academics try to divine the “original understanding” of the Constitution, 
the results can be “obscure to the point of inscrutability.”20  But when the focus 
turns on the war power, the issue isn’t that complicated.  All wars, big or small, 
declared or undeclared, “had to be legislatively authorized.”21  David Gray Adler 
concludes that the Constitution “makes Congress the sole and exclusive 
repository of the ultimate foreign relations power—the authority to initiate 
war.”22 
The major exception to these studies is an article written in 1996 by John 
Yoo, who argues that the framers designed a system that encouraged presidential 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 16, 1798), in 21 THE PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461, 461-62 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) (emphasis in original). 
 17. Id. 
 18. W. TAYLOR REVELEY, III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO 
HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCHES? 29 (1981) 
 19. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 36 (1986). 
 20. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993). 
 21. Id. 
 22. David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 
1996). 
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initiatives in war.23  Yoo never distinguishes between the President’s legitimate 
defensive powers and the legislative decision to initiate offensive actions against 
other nations.  Taking the United States from a state of peace to a state of war 
was a prerogative assigned exclusively to Congress.  Yoo makes no mention of 
the statements by President Washington, Secretary of War John Knox, President 
Jefferson, President Monroe, and other executive leaders who recognized that 
Presidents are limited to defensive actions. 24 
In The Prize Cases of 1863, Justice Grier spoke clearly about the President’s 
authority to conduct defensive but not offensive actions.  The President “has no 
power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic 
State.”25  Richard Henry Dana, Jr., representing the executive branch, agreed that 
the actions by President Lincoln during the Civil War had nothing to do with 
“the right to initiate a war, as a voluntary act of sovereignty.  That is vested 
solely in Congress.”26 
According to Yoo, the Constitution’s provisions on the war power did not 
break with British precedents, “but instead followed in their footsteps.”27  He 
concludes that “the war powers provisions of the Constitution are best 
understood as an adoption, rather than a rejection, of the traditional British 
approach to war powers.”28  That position is contradicted not only by statements 
made at the Philadelphia Convention and state ratifying conventions but by 
express language placed in Articles I and II of the Constitution.  Blackstone 
assigned these powers exclusively to the Executive: powers over war and peace, 
treaty-making, appointing ambassadors, issuing letters of marque and reprisal, 
raising armies and navies, and controlling foreign commerce.29  Those powers 
are either given expressly to Congress or shared between the President and the 
Senate.  The framers largely repudiated the notion of executive prerogative in 
foreign affairs.30 
 
 23. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding 
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996). 
 24. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 13-69 (1995).  See also Letter from Henry 
Knox to Governor Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
194, 195 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936); Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Nov. 
226, 1792), supra at 220-21; Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (March 23, 1795), 
supra at 386-87; George Washington, Letter to Governor William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 
33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 72, 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). 
 25. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 639 (1863). 
 26. Id. at 669 (emphasis in original). 
 27. Yoo, supra note 23, at 197. 
 28. Id. at 242. 
 29. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *240, *252-53, *256-58, *262 (1803). 
 30. For further analysis of Yoo’s position, see Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1658-68 (2000). 
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II. IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMERS’ MODEL 
There is a reasonably close fit, from 1789 to 1950, between what the framers 
expected and what was actually carried out.  Throughout that period, Congress 
was fairly consistent in protecting its war and spending powers.  For all of the 
major military actions, Congress either declared war or authorized war.  
Declarations were used for the War of 1812 against England, the War of 1846 
against Mexico, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and both world wars.  
Authorizations were used for the Indian wars, the Whiskey rebellion, the Quasi 
War against France from 1798 to 1800, and the Barbary Wars during the 
Jefferson and Madison administrations.31 
In the exercise of the spending power, Congress functioned with confidence 
as the repository of the power of the purse.  Of course criticism has always been 
directed at Congress, but legislators kept close tabs on the spending of money by 
the executive branch and never seriously entertained the idea of vesting in the 
President an item-veto authority. 
A. War Powers 
Presidents recognized that their powers over war were restricted to defensive 
operations.  President George Washington and his Secretary of War, Henry 
Knox, confined military actions against hostile Indian forces to defensive 
measures.  Anything of an offensive nature was a matter for Congress to 
decide.32  For domestic insurrections, like the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, 
Washington carefully followed the statutory procedures set forth by Congress, 
including a novel requirement that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or 
a federal district judge would have to first notify the President that the ordinary 
governmental institutions within a state were unable to meet the danger.33 
When it came to mounting a military campaign against France in 1798, 
President John Adams never pretended that he had any express or inherent 
authority to act alone.  He knew he had to come to Congress to explain the 
situation and request statutory authority.34  President Thomas Jefferson was 
willing to take certain defensive actions against the Barbary pirates, but 
acknowledged that he was “unauthorized by the Constitution, without the 
sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense.”  It was up to Congress 
to authorize “measures of offence also.”35  In 1805, President Jefferson advised 
 
 31. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 24, at 13-28. 
 32. 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 195, 220-21, 387 (Clarence Edwin 
Carter ed. 1936); 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73. 
 33. 1 Stat. 264, sec. 2 (1792); 1 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 150-52 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897-1925) (hereafter Richardson); HOMER 
CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 43-45 (1937). 
 34. 1 Stat. 547-611 (1798). 
 35. 1 Richardson 315. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] WAR AND SPENDING PREROGATIVES 13 
Congress about a serious situation with Spain, carefully noting: “Congress alone 
is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace 
to war.”36 
This pattern of deference to Congress could be broken, as it was, by 
Presidents like James Polk who moved U.S. troops into disputed territory and 
provoked a military clash.  Still, Polk never believed that he could go to war 
against Mexico on his own authority.  He knew he had to come to Congress, 
explain the situation, and depend on Congress to issue a declaration of war by 
recognizing that “a state of war exists.”37 
President Abraham Lincoln exercised a number of extraordinary powers 
while Congress was out of session, claiming that his actions in the midst of a 
civil war were forced upon him.  Lincoln, however, never argued that he had full 
constitutional authority to act as he did.  When Congress returned, he explained 
that his actions, “whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what 
appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, 
that Congress would readily ratify them.”38  In passing legislation to bless 
retroactively what Lincoln had done, lawmakers acted on the explicit assumption 
that his actions were illegal.39  Furthermore, Lincoln justified his actions partly 
on statutes enacted in 1795 and 1807 that authorized the President to suppress 
insurrections.40 
A recent study on judicial cases affecting the war power concludes that 
courts are reluctant to rule on these matters but “when they are forced to rule, 
they usually uphold presidential action.”41  An earlier study claimed that the 
Supreme Court, before World War I, generally refused to decide war power 
disputes.42  Those statements misinterpret the record of judicial rulings.  From 
the outset, court decisions restricted presidential power and recognized that the 
war making power resides in Congress. 
In 1800, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress can either declare 
war or authorize it, as it had done with the Quasi War.43  A year later, Chief 
Justice John Marshall said that “the whole powers of war” are vested in 
Congress.44  In an 1804 case, Marshall was asked whether President Adams 
could issue a proclamation during the Quasi War that exceeded the statutory 
 
 36. Annals of Cong., 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1805). 
 37. 9 Stat. 9 (1846); FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 24, at 29-34. 
 38. 7 Richardson 3225. 
 39. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 393 (1861) (Senator Howe); 12 Stat. 326 (1861). 
 40. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668. 
 41. MARTIN S. SHEFFER, THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS x-
xi (1999). 
 42. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS 
SINCE 1918, at vii, 1, 16 (1989). 
 43. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 44. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). 
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boundaries set forth by Congress.45  The answer was a flat No.46  When 
Congress passes a law establishing national policy for military operations, the 
President must execute statutory policy, not independent and inconsistent 
executive initiatives.47 
In 1806, in a case involving the Neutrality Act, a circuit court again rejected 
the notion that the President could exercise war powers independent of and in 
conflict with legislative policy.48  Executive officials, including the President, 
could not waive statutory policy: “if a private individual, even with the 
knowledge and approbation of this high and preeminent officer of our 
government [the President], should set on foot such a military expedition, how 
can he expect to be exonerated from the obligation of the law?”49  The court 
asked and answered its own question: “Does [the President] possess the power of 
making war?  That power is exclusively vested in congress.”  It was “the 
exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state or war.”50  
As already mentioned, precisely the same statement was made by Justice Grier 
and Richard Henry Dana, Jr. in The Prize Cases.51 
On a number of occasions Presidents used military force without seeking the 
authority of Congress.  These so-called “life and property actions” number about 
two hundred, but they are generally modest in scope and limited in duration.52  
They are in no sense a precedent for some of the presidential actions after World 
War II, including President Truman taking the nation to war against North Korea 
in 1950, President Bush claiming in 1990 that he could go to war against Iraq 
without congressional authority, and the repeated uses of military force by 
President Clinton in Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and other countries.  Moreover, 
many of those operations, involving repeated U.S. interventions into Central 
America and the Caribbean, would be condemned today both under the non-
intervention policy of the Organization of American States (OAS) and Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter, which proscribes “the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” 
B. Spending Powers 
The power of the purse remained largely in the hands of Congress from 1789 
to 1950.  Through its creation of standing committees, Congress exercised close 
control over appropriations and revenues.  Throughout the nineteenth century, 
 
 45. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 19, 342). 
 49. Id. at 1230. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See supra notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text. 
 52. Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-
1998, Congressional Research Service Report No. 98-881 F (1998). 
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Congress monitored with great care any discretionary spending power it 
extended to executive officials.  Subject to statutory guidelines, Presidents and 
executive officials were allowed to move funds from one appropriations account 
to another account (transfers between accounts) or from one fiscal year to the 
next (transfers between years).  Congress tightened these statutory limits 
whenever it decided to exercise closer control.53 
In the years following the Civil War, Congress came in for heavy criticism 
for its handling of pension legislation and rivers and harbors bills.  In the popular 
press, some Presidents gained a reputation as the guardian of the Treasury.  
President Chester A. Arthur vetoed a rivers and harbors bill in 1882 because he 
thought the spending level was excessive.  Although the veto was overridden, a 
cartoon by Thomas Nast shows Arthur, armed with a rifle, watching an oversized 
vulture perched on the Capitol consume his veto message.  At the bottom of the 
cartoon are these words of encouragement: “President Arthur, hit him again!  
Don’t let the vulture become our national bird.”54  President Grover Cleveland 
vetoed hundreds of private and general pension bills designed to reward, in his 
mind, undeserving claimants.  Another Thomas Nast cartoon captures the 
President exercising his role as protector of the purse.  Cleveland manfully 
blocks the door to the U.S. Treasury while thwarted pension agents slink from 
his presence.55 
At the end of the nineteenth century, a succession of budget deficits 
triggered pressure for reform.  Proposals to shift budgetary prerogatives from 
Congress to the President, by adopting a British parliamentary system, were 
regularly rejected by lawmakers.  Executive officials, private citizens, and even 
members of Congress recommended that Congress be prohibited from 
appropriating money unless it had been requested by the head of a department, 
Congress could muster a two-third majority, or the funds were needed to pay a 
claim against the government or for routine departmental expenses.56  Congress 
considered these proposals with great care and rejected them all.  “Uncle Joe” 
Cannon, Speaker of the House from 1903 to 1911, warned in 1919 that an 
executive budget along the lines of the British parliamentary system would 
signify the surrender of the most important element of representative 
government: “I think we had better stick pretty close to the Constitution with its 
division of powers well defined and the taxing power close to the people.”57 
 
 53. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 99-104, 123-127 (1975). 
 54. Harper’s Weekly, Aug. 12, 1882, at 497. 
 55. Harper’s Weekly, July 3, 1886, at 421. 
 56. John J. Fitzgerald, Budget Systems, Municipal Research, No. 62 (June 1915), at 312, 
322, 327, 340; Charles Wallace Collins, Constitutional Aspects of a National Budget System, 25 
YALE L.J. 376, 382-83 (1916); H.R. Doc. No. 65-1006 (1918); Annual Report of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, 1918-19, at 121 (from his testimony of October 4, 1919, to the House Committee on 
the Budget); DAVID HOUSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON’S CABINET 88 (1926). 
 57. JOSEPH G. CANNON, THE NATIONAL BUDGET, H.R. DOC. NO. 66-264, at 28-29 (1919). 
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In passing the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress provided for 
an executive budget in the sense that the President would submit a budget and be 
responsible for the estimates in it.  Thereafter it became a legislative budget, with 
Congress retaining full power to increase or reduce the President’s estimates.  
Increases could be made in committee or on the floor, and in either place by 
simple majority vote.  The act did not contemplate in any fashion the surrender 
of congressional prerogatives.  It did not make Congress subordinate to the 
President’s plan, which was merely a starting-point for legislative 
consideration.58 
C. Slippage in the 1930s 
Although large-scale legislative abdication did not occur until after World 
War II, there were troublesome signs in the 1930s about Congress’s capacity to 
conduct itself as a coequal branch.  One area was tariff policy.  Throughout the 
nineteenth century, Congress had delegated to the President a number of 
discretionary powers over tariffs, including the power to impose embargoes, 
suspend duty-free arrangements, and administer a set of flexible tariffs.59  
However, so discredited was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which put 
members of Congress on public display as enacting high tariffs to satisfy the 
needs of lobbyists, that Congress decided to shift power to the executive branch.  
In 1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Act, which authorized the 
President to adjust duties by up to 50 percent by entering into reciprocal 
agreements with other nations.60  This legislation was more than a standard 
delegation.  It marked an early stage of abdication because Congress acted out of 
institutional embarrassment and self-doubt. 
A similar pattern appears in the decision of Congress in the 1930s to shift to 
the President new powers to reorganize executive agencies.  Instead of the 
President coming to Congress with a reorganization proposal, which could be 
ignored or substantially amended by legislators, the President received authority 
to submit a reorganization plan subject to legislative review for a period of 60 
days.  Unless either House disapproved within that period of time, the plan 
would become law.61  Thus, the President could make new law without 
Congress.  In delegating this extraordinary authority, lawmakers were clearly 
disillusioned by their inability to enact legislation in the face of strong interest 
groups.  The prevailing congressional sentiment is expressed by Senator David 
Reed (R-Pa.): 
 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 67-14, at 6-7 (1921). 
 59. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 133-144 (1972). 
 60. See RAYMOND P. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 37 (1963); 
FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 133-144 (1972). 
 61. See generally, 47 Stat. 413-15, Title IV (1932). 
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Mr. President, I do not often envy other countries their governments, but I say 
that if this country ever needed a Mussolini it needs one now.  I am not 
proposing that we make Mr. Hoover our Mussolini, I am not proposing that we 
should abdicate our authority that is in us, but if we are to get economies made 
they have to be made by some one who has the power to make the order and 
stand by it.  Leave it to Congress and we will fiddle around here all summer 
trying to satisfy every lobbyist, and we will get nowhere.62 
One other development in the 1930s deserves mention: the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.63  The Court was asked to 
determine the constitutionality of a statute that empowered the President to 
declare an arms embargo in South America whenever he decided it might 
contribute to peace among the belligerents.  The issue was whether Congress 
could delegate its power to the President.  No one claimed an independent power 
of the President to act. 
Nevertheless, the author of the decision, Justice George Sutherland, went 
beyond the specific issue at hand and indulged in dicta to magnify presidential 
power.  First, he argued that foreign and domestic affairs are different “both in 
respect of their origin and their nature” because the powers of external 
sovereignty “passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the 
colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of 
America.”64  A number of scholars have discredited this analysis.65  The power 
of external sovereignty did not bypass the colonies, or states, and go directly to 
the President.  The Constitution allocates the power of external sovereignty to 
both Congress and the President. 
Sutherland claimed that legislation over the international field must often 
accord to the President “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restrictions which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved.”66  Note the jump.  Sutherland goes from statutory grants of power 
from Congress to the President, as with the arms embargo, to “freedom from 
statutory restrictions.”  Through this analysis, the President had gained the ability 
to operate on his own, unrestricted by Congress.  Sutherland reaches this result 
by identifying the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President to 
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”67 
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The phrase “sole organ” comes from a famous speech by John Marshall in 
1800 when he served in the House of Representatives.  However, Marshall never 
argued that the President was the “sole organ” in making national policy, which 
requires joint action by the President and Congress.  Only after Congress has 
enacted a law, or after the Senate has approved a treaty, did the President 
become the “sole organ” in implementing national policy.68  Despite these 
misconceptions and misreadings of history, Sutherland’s opinion is cited widely 
by the courts and academics to support not only broad delegations of legislative 
power to the President but also the existence of independent, implied, and 
inherent powers for the President.69 
III. UNRAVELING OF THE WAR POWER 
In 1950, President Truman singlehandedly intervened in Korea without ever 
seeking authority from Congress.  For the first time, a President had invoked 
independent power to initiate a major war.  Members of Congress groused a bit 
but never took any tangible steps to protect their prerogatives.  Truman offered 
two basic legal arguments: he engaged in a “police action,” not a war, and he 
operated under the “aegis” of a resolution passed by the UN Security Council.  
Neither argument survives scrutiny, but using a Security Council resolution as a 
substitute for a congressional statute established an important precedent.  In 
1990, President Bush claimed he could wage war against Iraq on the basis of a 
Security Council resolution.  Similarly, President Clinton initiated military 
actions in Haiti and Bosnia and continued air strikes against Iraq by referring to 
“authority” in UN resolutions. 
A. The UN Charter 
Truman’s use of a Security Council resolution to justify military intervention 
in Korea has no support under the text and legislative history of the UN Charter.  
In the drafting of the Charter, procedures were developed to permit the UN to 
employ military force to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression.  All UN members would make available to the Security 
Council, “on its call and in accordance with a special agreement,” armed forces 
and other assistance for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security.  The special agreements reached between the Security Council and 
 
 68. Annals of Cong., 6th Cong. 613-14 (1800). 
 69. Delegation: Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 n.21 (1944); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 
17 (1965); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 n.1 (1979).  Inherent powers:  United States 
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1975); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 
(1981). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] WAR AND SPENDING PREROGATIVES 19 
member states “shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”70 
The meaning of “constitutional processes” varied from country to country 
and had to be decided by their governments.  During Senate debate on the UN 
Charter, President Truman sent a cable from Potsdam stating that all agreements 
involving U.S. troop commitments to the UN would first have to be approved by 
both Houses of Congress.  He made this unequivocal pledge: “When any such 
agreement or agreements are negotiated it will be my purpose to ask the 
Congress for appropriate legislation to approve them.”71  Backed by this 
assurance, the Senate supported the UN Charter by a vote of 89 to two.72 
The statutory definition of “constitutional processes” for the United States is 
set forth in the UN Participation Act of 1945.  Without the slightest ambiguity, 
Section 6 of the statute provides that the agreements “shall be subject to the 
approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution.”73  The 
legislative history of this statute is replete with assurances from Under Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson that only after the President received the approval of 
Congress could he offer U.S. troops to the Security Council.74 
The limits of presidential power to use armed forces under UN actions are 
clarified and reinforced by a statutory amendment in 1949, allowing the 
President on his own initiative to provide military forces to the UN for 
“cooperative action.”  However, executive power is tightly constrained.  These 
forces may serve only as observers and guards, may perform only in a 
noncombatant capacity, and may not exceed one thousand.75 
B. Mutual Security Treaties 
It was during the time of the UN Charter and the UN Participation Act that 
Presidents gained access to another potential expansion of executive power: 
mutual security treaties.  President Clinton would rely on NATO for “authority” 
to conduct air strikes in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, but the text and the legislative 
history of these treaties offer no legal support for his actions.  Like the UN 
Charter, the Senate understood these treaties in more limited terms and the 
President pushed his powers to the maximum. 
The NATO treaty of 1949 provides that an armed attack against one or more 
of the parties in Europe or North America “shall be considered an attack against 
 
 70. U.N. Charter art. 43, para 3. 
 71. 91 CONG. REC. 8185 (1945). 
 72. Id. at 8190. 
 73. 59 Stat. 621, sec. 6 (1945). 
 74. Participation by the United States in the United Nations Organization: Hearings Before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 79th Cong. 79-23 (1945); see also S. REP. NO. 79-717, 
at 5, 8 (1945); H.R. REP. NO. 79-138, at 7 (1945); 91 CONG. REC. 12267 (1945) (Cong. Sol 
Bloom). 
 75. 63 Stat. 735-36, sec. 5 (1949). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
20 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:7 
them all.”76  The treaty further provides that, in the event of an attack, the 
member states may exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter and assist the country or countries 
attacked by taking “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force.”  Article 11 of the treaty states that it shall be ratified “and its provisions 
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes.”77 
The principle of an attack on one nation constituting an attack on all has 
never been interpreted as requiring an immediate or automatic response from any 
nation.  Each country maintains the sovereign right to decide such matters for 
itself.  As noted in the Rio Treaty of 1947, “no State shall be required to use 
armed force without its consent.”78  During hearings in 1949, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson conceded that if a signatory nation were the victim of an armed 
attack, the United States would not be pulled automatically into war: “[u]nder 
our Constitution, the Congress alone has the power to declare war.”79 
Moreover, NATO did not authorize offensive actions or general 
peacekeeping operations. The North Atlantic Treaty was a defensive pact, 
intended to contain the Soviet Union.  The treaty’s parties were “resolved to 
unite their efforts for collective defense” and “resist armed attack.”  In 1999, 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke with approval these words of Prime 
Minister Spaak of Belgium, offered five decades earlier: “The new NATO pact 
is purely defensive; it threatens no one.”80  Yet, under Clinton, NATO would 
expand its mission to justify offensive operations in Bosnia and Yugoslavia. 
NATO countries were directed to carry out the treaty “in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes.”  Allowing the President to conduct war 
singlehandedly against other countries is a flat violation of the Constitution.  
When the Senate agreed to NATO, it never acquiesced in such an interpretation.  
Nor could it have.  Such an interpretation would have eliminated the 
constitutional power of the House of Representatives to decide matters of war. 
At the time NATO was established, one scholar argued that the provisions of 
the treaty that it be carried out according to constitutional processes was 
“intended to ensure that the Executive Branch of the Government should come 
back to Congress when decisions were required in which the Congress has a 
constitutional responsibility.”81  The NATO treaty “does not transfer to the 
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President the Congressional power to make war.”82  The repeated assurances that 
the war prerogatives of Congress would be protected under the UN Charter and 
mutual security treaties like NATO would, in time, mean nothing. 
C. The Korean War 
Given the text of the UN Charter and the UN Participation Act, fortified by 
their legislative histories, how was President Truman able to send U.S. troops to 
Korea—under the umbrella of a UN action—without ever seeking or obtaining 
congressional approval?  Answer: He simply ignored the procedure for special 
agreements that was designed to safeguard congressional control.  No special 
agreement was entered into in 1950, nor has any special agreement ever been 
entered into, by any nation, in the years since 1950.  The procedure for special 
agreements has been made a nullity by the executive branch. 
Truman could exploit the UN machinery because of a fluke: the Soviet 
Union absented itself from the Security Council when it twice passed resolutions 
regarding military action in Korea.  Had the Soviet Union been present, it would 
likely have exercised a veto over the resolutions.  How does the absence of the 
Soviets relate to constitutional authority?  It cannot be seriously argued that the 
scope of presidential power fluctuates with the presence or absence of Soviet 
delegates to the Security Council.83 
Several statements from the Truman administration suggest that it was acting 
pursuant to UN authority.  On June 29, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson said 
that all U.S. actions taken in Korea “have been under the aegis of the United 
Nations.”84  Aegis is a fudge word, hinting at a legal relationship that never 
existed.  The United States never operated under the legal banner of the UN.  
The UN did not exercise authority over the conduct of the war.  Other than token 
support from a few nations, it remained an American war—measured by troops, 
money, casualties, and deaths—from start to finish. 
Acheson also stated that Truman had done his “utmost to uphold the sanctity 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the rule of law,” and that the 
administration was in “conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council of 
June 25 and 27, giving air and sea support to the troops of the Korean 
government.”85  The first resolution did not call for military action.  As for the 
second, which did, Truman committed U.S. forces to Korea before the Council 
acted on the second resolution.  Acheson later admitted that “some American 
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action, said to be in support of the resolution of June 27, was in fact ordered, and 
possibly taken, prior to the resolution.”86 
Senators from both parties acquiesced to Truman’s decision.  Senator 
Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.), the minority whip, supported Truman by saying 
“it seems to me the responsibility of the President of the United States to protect 
the security of the United States.”87  Senator Arthur Watkins (R-Utah) asked 
whether Truman should not have notified Congress before ordering military 
forces to Korea.  Senator Scott Lucas (D-Ill.), the majority leader, replied 
casually: “I am willing to leave what has been done in the hands of the 
Commander in Chief.”88  A purer form of abdication could not be imagined. 
Other Senators spoke deferentially about presidential power.  Senator 
George Malone (R-Nev.) said “[c]ongress cannot determine policy.  Congress 
can only debate the foreign policy determined by the executive department. . . . 
The Constitution of the United States leaves determinations of foreign policy to 
the President.”89  When Truman met with congressional leaders on July 3, 1950, 
and asked whether he should present to Congress a joint resolution seeking 
approval of his action in Korea, Lucas told him not to bother.90  If the emergency 
facing Truman in June 1950 was so fast-moving and perilous that he had to act 
in advance of legislative authorization, nothing prevented him from returning to 
Congress at the earliest opportunity to ask for retroactive authority, as Lincoln 
had done. 
Truman tried to justify his actions in Korea by calling it a “police action” 
rather than a war.91  Although Truman and Acheson continued to avoid the 
designation of war for the fighting in Korea, federal courts had no such 
difficulty.  A district court noted in 1953: “We doubt very much if there is any 
question in the minds of the majority of the people of this country that the 
conflict now raging in Korea can be anything but war.”92 
The check on Truman came from the public and the courts, not from 
Congress.  In 1952, facing a nationwide strike of steelworkers, he issued an 
executive order taking possession of the plants and facilities of 87 major steel 
companies.93  Newspapers around the country published editorials that 
condemned Truman’s theory of inherent and emergency power.  They ripped 
him for acting in a manner they regarded as arbitrary, dictatorial, dangerous, 
destructive, high-handed, and unauthorized by law.94  Unwisely, Assistant 
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Attorney General Homer Baldridge told the district judge that courts were 
powerless to control the exercise of presidential power when directed toward 
emergency conditions.95  The district court wrote a blistering opinion that 
repudiated this theory of inherent and unchecked presidential power.96  The 
Supreme Court, split 6 to 3, sustained that decision.97 
D. The Vietnam War 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower regarded Truman’s action in Korea as a 
political and constitutional mistake.  To foster joint action between the legislative 
and executive branches, he asked Congress to pass “area resolutions” to 
authorize in advance whatever military action might be necessary in the Formosa 
Straits and the Middle East.98  When legislators asked why he requested statutory 
authority instead of acting unilaterally under executive power, he explained 
patiently that the Constitution “assumes that our two branches of government 
should get along together.”99  Under pressure in 1954 to commit U.S. troops to 
Indochina, he refused to act unless he first obtained statutory authority from 
Congress.100 
President Lyndon B. Johnson understood the risks of getting involved in 
Vietnam and did not want to act unilaterally, as Truman had done in Korea.  Yet 
he didn’t want to appear to be “soft on communism” and open himself to attacks 
by Richard Nixon and Senator Barry Goldwater.101  In August 1964, after reports 
on two attacks on U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf, he went to Congress and 
obtained a resolution authorizing him to respond militarily.  The first attack did 
not justify an escalation of the conflict.  The second attack probably never 
occurred.102 
Senator Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) had received some inside information 
raising doubts about whether the second attack took place.  He also charged that 
the administration had deceived Congress and the public by presenting North 
Vietnam as the aggressor, rather than admitting that the U.S. had acted as 
provocateur by assisting South Vietnamese military actions.103  Despite all the 
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uncertainty about what had happened, Congress quickly passed the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution by a unanimous vote in the House and only two dissenting votes in 
the Senate.  There were no independent legislative investigations to verify the 
administration’s story. 
During floor debate, Senators urged that legislative discussion be curbed in 
the interest of uniting behind the President.104  At most, legislators said they 
could offer the President advice, if consulted.105  The same desire to rally around 
the flag characterized debate in the House.106  One of the remarkable comments 
was by Congressman Edwin Adair (R-Ind.), who said that the issue of 
congressional abdication was raised in committee but “we were given assurance 
that it was the attitude of the Executive that such was not the case, that we are 
not impairing our congressional prerogatives.”107  If legislators are anxious about 
possible abdication of legislative authority, just turn to the executive branch and 
have the doubts removed. 
The Vietnam commitment continued to expand because many lawmakers 
who were strongly opposed to the war refused to say anything in public.  The 
prime example is Senator Richard Russell, powerful chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and an influential adviser to President Johnson.  
Russell had warned about American involvement in Vietnam from Eisenhower 
through Johnson but rarely spoke out about his misgivings.108  Public opposition 
from Russell would have been pivotal in ending America’s commitment to 
Southeast Asia, yet he kept silent. One scholar suggested two reasons: “First, he 
had a misguided sense of what was respect for the president, and of the need to 
support the flag once committed.  More important was his total lack of 
understanding of congressional responsibility in exercising power over the 
executive under Article I, §8, of the Constitution.”109 
During hearings in 1968, Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) admitted 
that as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he should have 
taken additional time to review the merits of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution: “I feel 
very guilty for not having enough sense at that time to have raised these 
questions and asked for evidence.  I regret it.”110  A year later, a Senate report 
concluded that when Congress adopted the Tonkin Gulf Resolution it committed 
the error of “making a personal judgment as to how President Johnson would 
implement the resolution when it had a responsibility to make an institutional 
 
 104. Id. at 18421 (Senators Church and Humphrey), 18457 (Senator Aiken). 
 105. Id. at 18457-58. 
 106. Id. at 18542 (Congressmen Albert and Halleck). 
 107. Id. at 18543. 
 108. EZRA Y. SIFF, WHY THE SENATE SLEPT: THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION AND THE 
BEGINNING OF AMERICA’S VIETNAM WAR 2, 7-10, 40, 52-57, 100 (1999). 
 109. Id. at 56. 
 110. The Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents:  Hearings Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 90th Cong. 80 (1968). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] WAR AND SPENDING PREROGATIVES 25 
judgment, first, as to what any President would do with so great an 
acknowledgment of power, and, second, as to whether, under the Constitution, 
Congress had the right to grant or concede the authority in question.”111 
E. The War Powers Resolution   
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is usually described as a major effort to 
“reassert” congressional prerogatives.  When the measure became law over 
President Nixon’s veto, the New York Times regarded the statute as “the most 
aggressive assertion of independence and power by the legislative branch against 
the executive branch in many years.”112  However, its editorial contained more of 
a mixed message.  After calling the statute “a resurgence of Congressional 
independence after a long period of acquiescence to the Executive’s accretion of 
power,”  the editorial stated accurately that the law did not “in any way curtail 
the President’s freedom, as Commander in Chief, to respond to emergency 
situations.  If anything, it gives the Chief Executive more discretionary authority 
than the framers of the Constitution intended in order to deal with modern 
contingencies that they could not have foreseen.”113 
Section 2(a) of the Resolution claims that it is intended “to fulfill the intent 
of the framers” and to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress 
and the President” will apply to the introduction of U.S. forces to foreign 
hostilities.  But by recognizing that the President may use armed force for up to 
90 days without authority from Congress, the resolution legalizes a scope of 
independent presidential power that would have astonished the framers.  
Moreover, it does not in any sense insure collective judgment.  Presidents 
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton used military force repeatedly without ever seeking 
or obtaining authority from Congress. 
Given the national calamity of the Vietnam War and the soul-searching by 
Fulbright and other legislators, how could Congress have passed such a botched 
measure?  Part of the reason is the political process of taking a weak House bill 
and a strong Senate bill and seeking compromise language in conference 
committee.  Splitting the difference between the two chambers is common and 
acceptable practice for most bills.  Shall we spend $10 billion or $8 billion on a 
housing program?  Settling on $9 billion does not threaten or diminish the 
Constitution.  What the War Powers Resolution did, however, was to 
compromise fundamental institutional and constitutional principles. 
That fact is borne out by the House effort to override Nixon’s veto.  Fifteen 
members initially voted against the bill and the conference version because the 
legislation shifted too much power to the President.  To be consistent, they 
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should have voted to sustain the veto to prevent the bill from becoming law.  Yet 
they switched sides and delivered the decisive votes for enactment.  Many of 
them decided that giving Nixon a black eye was more important than protecting 
congressional prerogatives.114  For example, Representative Bella Abzug (D-
N.Y.) urged an override to “accelerate the demand for the impeachment of the 
President.”115  A number of legislators correctly saw the measure as an 
expansion of presidential warmaking power.116 
Senator Tom Eagleton (D-Mo.), a principal sponsor of the War Powers 
Resolution when it was introduced in the Senate, denounced the bill that 
emerged from conference as a “total, complete distortion of the war powers 
concept.”117  Instead of the three narrow exceptions specified in the Senate bill, 
the conference report gave the President “carte blanche” authority to use military 
force for up to 90 days.  With memories so fresh about presidential extension of 
the war in Southeast Asia, Eagleton asked: “how can we give unbridled, 
unlimited total authority to the President to commit us to war?”118 
IV. FROM FORD TO CLINTON 
Operating in the shadow of the Vietnam War, Presidents Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter made minimal use of military force.  On three occasions Ford used 
U.S. forces to evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals from Southeast 
Asia.  There were only two other presidential initiatives to use armed forces: 
Ford’s rescue effort of the Mayaguez crew in 1975 and the attempt by Carter to 
rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980.119  In short order, however, military 
activity would accelerate under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. 
A. Reagan’s Initiatives 
In August 1982, President Reagan sent U.S. marines to Lebanon as part of a 
three-nation peacekeeping force.  He expected them to remain “no longer than 
30 days.”120  After conditions deteriorated in September, Reagan announced that 
the troops would remain “for a limited period of time.”121  A terrorist bomb on 
April 18, 1983, killed 16 Americans, followed by the deaths of two U.S. Marines 
on August 29 and two more on September 6.  Under Section 4(a)(1) of the War 
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Powers Resolution, the existence of “hostilities” required the President to trigger 
the 60-90 day clock, but Reagan refused to do so.  Here was another major flaw 
in the statute.  Instead of placing a two or three month restriction on presidential 
war initiatives, there was now no limit.  Members of Congress had to pass a 
statute to activate Section 4(a)(1), and in doing so they authorized Reagan to 
remain for 18 months.122 
Reagan also used military force against Grenada in 1983 and Libya in 1986, 
and on neither occasion did he seek authorization from Congress or report under 
Section 4(a)(1) to trigger the clock.  In fact, only one President has reported 
under that section, and that was President Ford as part of the Mayaguez crisis.  
However, his report had no practical effect on presidential power because it was 
sent to Congress after the crew had been rescued. 
Four times during the Reagan years, members of Congress went to court to 
challenge presidential military actions in El Salvador, Grenada, Nicaragua, and 
the Persian Gulf.123  The message from the courts was the same each time.  If 
Congress wanted the courts to referee these disputes, it would have to first 
confront the President by using all institutional powers available to it.  When 
Congress failed to defend its prerogatives, it could not expect to be bailed out by 
the courts. 
B. Bush Pushes the Envelope 
One might have thought that with the end of the Cold War against the Soviet 
Union, Congress would begin to recapture its war power.  However, under the 
Bush and Clinton administrations, Congress was more supine than ever.  Bush 
invaded Panama in 1989 without coming to Congress for authority and claimed 
he could go to war against Iraq in 1990 without legislative approval.  Only at the 
eleventh hour did Congress authorize the operation, and even at that point, in his 
signing statement, Bush denied that he needed authority from Congress.124 
The war against Iraq illustrates the importance of Truman’s precedent with 
Korea.  Like Truman, Bush obtained from the UN Security Council a resolution 
authorizing the use of force against Iraq.  On November 29, 1990, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing member states to use “all necessary 
means” to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.125  Although Bush considered it 
crucial to obtain the approval of the Security Council, he felt no comparable 
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need to seek authority from Congress.  Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 
testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on December 3, 1990, 
stated that President Bush did not require “any additional authorization from the 
Congress” before attacking Iraq.126  The phrase “additional authorization” 
implied that action by the Security Council was sufficient. 
Congressman Ron Dellums challenged in court the power of Bush to act 
singlehandedly against Iraq, but Judge Harold Greene held that the case was not 
ripe, partly because Congress as an institution had failed to confront Bush.127  At 
the same time, Judge Greene rejected the sweeping theory of presidential power 
presented by the Justice Department.  He said that if the President “had the sole 
power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, no matter 
how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive military attack, 
the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic 
decision by the Executive.”128 
Writing in 1998, Bush said that had Congress not passed the authorization 
bill in January 1991, he would have ordered troops into combat because it was 
“the right thing to do.”129  This is an autocratic or monarchical model.  What 
mattered to Bush was not the Constitution or legal constraints, but simply doing 
the right thing.  He excoriated Saddam Hussein for violating international law by 
invading Kuwait, but felt at liberty to violate the Constitution whenever he 
considered it necessary. 
C. Clinton’s Arrogation 
During his first seven years in office, President Clinton would use military 
force repeatedly, relying on what he considered to be his constitutional powers, 
augmented by decisions reached by the Security Council and NATO.  As a 
source of authority, Congress was not in the picture and never insisted on being 
in the picture. 
On June 26, 1993, Clinton ordered the launching of 23 cruise missiles into 
Baghdad as an exercise of the “inherent right of self-defense.”130  He acted after 
his administration concluded that the Iraqi intelligence service was responsible 
for a failed assassination attempt of former President Bush.  Clinton called the 
attack “an attack against our country and against all Americans.”131  Two 
attorneys of constitutional law thought it “quite a stretch” to call the bombing an 
act of self-defense for an assassination plot that had been averted two months 
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earlier.132  White House officials let the public know that this early use of force 
erased any doubts about Clinton’s ability to act decisively as Commander in 
Chief.  He could make the tough calls and sleep well.133 
Also in 1993, the initial U.S. humanitarian intervention into Somalia turned 
bloody and veered into “nation building.”134  Congressman Dellums asked: “who 
gave us the right—as peacekeepers—to determine which political figure or 
faction deserves to emerge victorious in Somalia?”135  Congress used its power 
of the purse to bring the military operation to a halt.  Legislation prohibited the 
use of any funds after March 31, 1994, for the operations of U.S. armed forces in 
Somalia unless the President requested an extension and received authority from 
Congress.136 
By October 1993, Clinton was threatening to invade Haiti to force the 
military regime to step down and allow the return of President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, who had been ousted on September 30, 1991.  Madeleine Albright, U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, said that the administration had “not ruled 
out” a unilateral use of force in Haiti.137  Congress took a number of votes to 
define its role on military action against Haiti.138  In the end it settled for weak, 
nonbinding statutory language, stating that it was the “sense of Congress” that 
funds in the defense appropriations bill should not be obligated or expended for 
U.S. military operations in Haiti unless (1) authorized in advance by Congress, 
(2) it was necessary to protect or evacuate U.S. citizens, or (3) the President 
determined that the deployment was “vital” to U.S. national security interests 
and there was insufficient time to seek and obtain congressional authorization.  
Even those elastic guidelines could be set aside if the President reported in 
advance that the deployment was justified by U.S. national security interests.139 
Like Truman in Korea and Bush in Iraq, Clinton circumvented Congress by 
turning to the Security Council, which adopted a resolution “inviting” all 
states—particularly those in the region of Haiti—to use “all necessary means” to 
remove the military leadership on that island.140  The Senate responded with a 
nonbinding resolution that stated that the Security Council resolution “does not 
constitute authorization for the deployment of United States Armed Forces in 
Haiti under the Constitution of the United States or pursuant to the War Powers 
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Resolution (Public Law 93-148).”  The Senate language passed by a vote of one 
hundred to zero.141  Having decided what does not constitute authorization, 
Congress could never agree on the legislative action mandated by the 
Constitution. 
In a nationwide televised address on September 15, 1994, Clinton told the 
public that he was prepared to use military force to invade Haiti, referring to the 
Security Council resolution and his willingness to “carry out the will of the 
United Nations.”142  No word from the President about carrying out the will of 
Congress or the American public.  Clinton was determined to proceed with the 
invasion, regardless of public opposition, because “I believe [it] is the right thing 
to do.  I realize it is unpopular.  I know it is unpopular.  I know the timing is 
unpopular.  I know the whole thing is unpopular.  But I believe it is the right 
thing.”143  There seemed to be no interest in doing the legal thing, the authorized 
thing, the constitutional thing.  The planned invasion was shelved when former 
President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and Colin Powell were able to 
convince the military leaders to step down and permit Aristide’s return.144 
With regard to Bosnia, Clinton announced on May 7, 1993, that he would 
have to obtain authority from Congress before ordering air strikes.145  However, 
he soon changed his language from authorization to congressional “support.”146  
By 1994, decisions to use air power in Bosnia were taken in response to Security 
Council resolutions and NATO decisions.  As Clinton explained: “the authority 
under which air strikes can proceed, NATO acting out of area pursuant to U.N. 
authority, requires the common agreement of our NATO allies.”147  Interestingly, 
Clinton would have to obtain approval from England, France, Italy, and other 
NATO allies, but not from Congress. 
Air strikes began in February 1994 and continued in April, August, and 
November.  Clinton told reporters that the military activity was “conducted in 
strict accordance of existing U.N. policy” and that the Security Council 
resolution “gives NATO the authority to act.”148  By approaching international 
and regional bodies, like the UN and NATO, Clinton effectively sidestepped 
Congress and its constitutional prerogatives.  Air strikes continued during the 
 
 141. 140 CONG. REC. 19324 (1994). 
 142. Interview with Wire Service Reporters on Haiti, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1559 (September 
14,1994). 
 143. Id. at 1551. 
 144. John F. Harris & Douglas Farah, Clinton Halts Invasion as Haiti Leaders Agree to Quit; 
U.S. Forces Land Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1994, at A1. 
 145. The President’s News Conference with European Community Leaders, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
594 (May 7, 1993). 
 146. The President’s New Conference with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan in 
New York City, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1620 (Sept. 27, 1993). 
 147. Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, 1 PUB. PAPERS 186 (Feb. 6, 1994). 
 148. Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, 1 PUB. PAPERS 661 (Apr. 11, 1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] WAR AND SPENDING PREROGATIVES 31 
first half of 1995, with the war’s biggest air raid conducted at the end of August 
1995.  Clinton said he conducted the bombing attacks as “authorized by the 
United Nations.”149 
Clinton’s next step was sending about 20,000 U.S. ground troops to Bosnia.  
In an effort to restrict this deployment, both Houses debated a number of 
amendments, ranging from binding to nonbinding provisions.150  Most of the 
lawmakers showed great deference to presidential power.  Congressman James 
B. Longley, Jr. (R-Me.) said it was a threat to American lives when Congress 
“attempts to micromanage foreign policy.  I have told the President that I would 
respect his authority as Commander in Chief.”151  It is not “micromanagement” 
when Congress debates sending ground troops to another country, nor does such 
legislative deliberation threaten American lives.  Those lives are threatened when 
the President puts them in harm’s way. 
The response in Congress depended greatly on what Bob Dole, the Senate 
Majority Leader, would do.  He decided to defer both to the President and to 
public polls: “We need to find some way to be able to support the President and I 
think we need to wait and see what the American reaction is.”152  In what must 
be one of the weakest, most internally inconsistent pieces of legislation ever 
passed, the Senate adopted language providing support for American troops but 
expressing “reservations” about sending them to Bosnia.153  The House also 
acted on a series of measures on Bosnia.  An amendment to prohibit funds from 
being used to deploy troops without congressional authorization failed, 210 to 
218.154  It next voted 287 to 141 to pass a nonbinding House resolution that 
expressed “serious concerns and opposition to the President’s policy” but 
declared that the House was confident U.S. troops would perform their 
responsibilities well.155  Another House resolution, “unequivocally” supporting 
American troops but omitting any direct criticism of the President’s policy, lost 
190 to 237.156 
The final escalation of military activity came in 1999 when Clinton 
participated with other NATO allies in the bombing of Yugoslavia.  Although 
Congress had no formal role in the use of force against the Serbs, legislatures in 
other NATO countries had to authorize military action.  It was necessary for  the 
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Italian Parliament to vote approval for the NATO strikes.157  The German 
Supreme Court ruled that the Bundestag, which had been dissolved with the 
election that ousted Chancellor Kohl, would have to be recalled to approve 
deployment of German aircraft and troops to Kosovo.158  Congress was content 
to watch from the back seat. 
On March 11, 1999, with Clinton close to unleashing air strikes against 
Serbia, the House voted on a resolution to support U.S. armed forces as part of a 
NATO peacekeeping operation.  The resolution—purporting to “authorize” 
Clinton to deploy U.S. forces to implement a peace agreement—passed 219 to 
191.159  However, legislators were voting on a concurrent resolution (H. Con. 
Res. 42), and Congress cannot authorize anything in a concurrent resolution 
because it has no legal effect.  Authorization requires a bill or joint resolution, 
both of which are presented to the President for his signature or veto.  A 
concurrent resolution passes both chambers but is not presented.  Lawmakers 
voted on something that started out as a joint resolution but changed at some 
point to a concurrent resolution, with no one alert enough or willing enough to 
change the word “authorize” to something more appropriate, like “support.”  
 Members of the House clearly anticipated a peace agreement between Serbs 
and Kosovars.  The Kosovars eventually accepted the plan but not the Serbs.  
Therefore, the House vote cannot be taken as support for the bombing operation 
that would begin within two weeks.  On March 23, the Senate voted 58 to 41 to 
support military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia.160  Like 
the House, the Senate made the mistake of using the word “authorize” in a 
concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 21).  The war against Serbia began on March 
24. 
On April 28, after the first month of bombing, the House took a series of 
votes on war in Serbia.  It voted 249 to 180 to prohibit the use of appropriated 
funds for the deployment of U.S. ground forces unless first authorized by 
Congress.  A motion to direct the removal of U.S. armed forces from Yugoslavia 
failed, 139 to 290.  A resolution to declare a state of war between the United 
States and Yugoslavia was rejected, 2 to 427.  A fourth vote, to authorize the air 
operations and missile strikes, failed on a tie vote, 213 to 213.161 
Newspaper editorials and commentators derided the House for these 
multiple and supposedly conflicting votes, but the House articulated some basic 
values.  It insisted that Congress authorize the introduction of ground troops and 
it refused to grant authority for the air strikes.  Lawmakers pointed to the irony of 
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President Clinton seeking the approval of 18 NATO nations but not the approval 
of Congress.  Congressman Ernest Istook (R-Okla.) remarked: “President 
Clinton asked many nations to agree to attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get 
permission from one crucial country, America.”162 
In contrast to the House, the Senate decided to duck the issue.  Senator John 
McCain offered a joint resolution to authorize Clinton to use “all necessary force 
and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United 
States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  This amendment was tabled, 78 to 
22.163  A few weeks later the Senate tabled another amendment, this one by 
Senator Specter, to direct the President to seek approval from Congress before 
introducing ground troops to Yugoslavia.  Failure to obtain approval would deny 
the President funds to conduct the operation.164  The Specter amendment was 
tabled, 52 to 48.165  An amendment by Senator Bob Smith (R-N.H.), to prohibit 
funding for military operations in Yugoslavia unless Congress enacted specific 
authorization, was tabled 77 to 21.166 
Through these successive tabling motions, the Senate might as well have 
considered one final motion: “[d]o we want to exercise our constitutional powers 
and participate in matters of war?”  Tabled, 63 to 37. 
Other American military actions occurred during 1998, again without 
congressional authorization.  In August, Clinton ordered cruise missiles into 
Afghanistan to attack paramilitary camps and into Sudan to destroy a 
pharmaceutical factory suspected of involvement in the production of nerve gas.  
A year after the attack on Sudan, news report still questioned whether the plant 
had a role in the manufacture of chemical weapons.167 
Clinton continued to use military force against Iraq.  In September 1996, he 
ordered the launching of cruise missiles against Iraq in response to an attack by 
Iraqi forces against the Kurdish-controlled city of Irbil in northern Iraq.  Cruise 
missiles also struck air defense capabilities in southern Iraq.  Clinton explained 
that the missiles “sent the following message to Saddam Hussein: When you 
abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors, you must pay a price.”168  
With that standard, how many nations could a President attack?  Quite a long 
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list.  Start with Russia and China and then turn to smaller but still substantial 
countries in Asia, Africa, and other continents. 
Toward the end of January 1998, Clinton threatened once more to bomb 
Iraq, this time because Saddam Hussein had refused to give UN inspectors full 
access to examine Iraqi sites for possible nuclear, chemical, and biological 
programs.  On February 19, during a visit to Tennessee State University, 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked how Clinton could order 
military action against Iraq after opposing American policy in Vietnam.  Her 
response: “We are talking about using military force, but we are not talking 
about a war.  That is an important distinction.”169  The distinction makes no 
sense, unless it is another administration effort to claim that the President has full 
authority to conduct military operations as long as they do not amount to “war.”  
In December 1998, Clinton ordered four days of bombing in Iraq.  In a letter 
to Congress, he argued that the military operation was “consistent with and has 
been taken in support of numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, including 
Resolutions 678 and 687.”  In this same message, he claimed that he acted under 
the authorization of P.L. 102-1, enacted in January 1991.170  To accept that 
argument, one would have to believe that Congress, in January 1991, fully 
delegated its war power to the Security Council and to the President.  However, 
the limited purpose of P.L. 102-1 and the Security Council resolutions was to get 
Iraq out of Kuwait, not to punish it in perpetuity. 
As a result of the December bombing, there are now no UN inspectors to 
monitor chemical, biological, and nuclear capability in Iraq.  Moreover, the 
administration has apparently jettisoned its legal reliance on Security Council 
resolutions.  Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense William S. 
Cohen warned that the United States and Britain would continue to act militarily 
against Iraq, with or without the approval of other allies or the UN Security 
Council.171  Over the following eight months, the United States and Britain 
conducted repeated air strikes against Iraq, firing more than 1,100 missiles 
against 359 targets, or triple the number of targets attacked during the four-day 
operation in December 1998.172 
V. BUDGET REFORMS FROM 1974 TO THE PRESENT 
A year after the War Powers Resolution, Congress passed the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, also widely touted as an effort to 
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reassert legislative power.  This statute has had a complex and mixed history, but 
there is good reason to conclude that it helped President Reagan in 1981 to pass a 
budget plan that led to a fivefold increase in the national debt.  The explosion of 
deficits led to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, which abdicated 
legislative power not so much to the President as to automatic formulas and 
triggers.  With Reagan’s encouragement, the drumbeat for transferring greater 
spending power to the President prompted Congress to consider a variety of 
measures, culminating in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. 
A. The Downside of Comprehensive Action 
The Budget Act of 1974 was enacted against a backdrop of executive claims 
that Congress was irresponsible in budget matters because it acted in piecemeal 
fashion on various appropriations, authorization, and tax bills.  In defending the 
President’s authority to withhold funds that Congress had appropriated, OMB 
Deputy Director Caspar Weinberger told a Senate committee in 1971 that “the 
whole nature of the appropriation process is such that Congress is, in one way or 
another, virtually prevented from taking an overall look at the effect of their total 
actions.”173 
During the 1972 election campaign, President Nixon charged that Congress, 
as an institution, acted irresponsibly on federal spending.  He attributed this 
behavior to the procedures that Congress used to consider the budget, asserting 
that Congress “not only does not consider the total financial picture when it votes 
on a particular spending bill, it does not even contain a mechanism to do so if it 
wished.”174  Budget problems resulted from the “hoary and traditional procedure 
of the Congress, which now permits action on the various spending programs as 
if they were unrelated and independent actions.”175  White House aides joined in 
the attack on Congress.  John Ehrlichman, the President’s domestic adviser, 
blasted the “credit-card Congress” for adding billions to the budget.  He likened 
the lawmakers to a spendthrift brother-in-law “who has gotten hold of the family 
credit card and is running up big bills” with no thought of paying them.176 
This was a bold move, calculated to put Congress on the defensive.  And it 
worked, even though easily available budget data demonstrated that Nixon’s 
picture of Congress was a caricature, for Congress had little net effect on total 
budget spending during his years in office.  Congress reduced Nixon’s 
appropriations requests for fiscal years 1969 through 1973 by a total of $30.9 
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billion.  That reduction was offset by a $30.5 billion increase in spending 
authorized by backdoor devices (such as contract authority on the clean-water 
program) and mandatory entitlements.177  In short, pretty much of a wash.  The 
budget deficits during the Nixon years were caused mainly by the loss of tax 
revenues due to the recession of 1970, not to runaway federal spending.178 
Instead of providing a more independent and objective analysis, Congress 
merely reiterated and reinforced Nixon’s aspersions.  In a report released in 
1973, a joint study committee on budget control linked the increasing size of 
budget deficits to procedural inadequacies within Congress: “The constant 
continuation of budget deficits plus their increasing size illustrates the need for 
Congress to obtain better control over the budget.”  The committee concluded 
that “the failure to arrive at congressional budget decisions on an overall basis 
has been a contributory factor” in the continuation of deficits.  No committee 
was responsible for deciding “whether or not total outlays are appropriate in 
view of the current situation.”  Spending bills were considered “as a separate 
entity.”179 
In fact, the system at that time was not so fragmented, incoherent, and 
irresponsible.  The Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures 
prepared “scorekeeping reports” and circulated them on a regular basis.  Those 
reports were printed regularly in the Congressional Record.  Legislators 
therefore knew, from month to month, how congressional action compared to the 
President’s budget.  Through informal techniques, Congress managed to 
coordinate its actions and change the shape of the President’s budget without 
exceeding its size.  The results reveal a systematic and responsible pattern, not 
chaos.  Congressional totals remained within the ballpark of the President’s 
budget.  Legislative spending was not wildly out of control. 
The arbitrary and heavy-handed impoundments by the Nixon administration 
provoked Congress to draft legislation to curb presidential power.  
Administration officials refused to back off.  At hearings in 1973, OMB 
Director-Designate Roy L. Ash defended impoundment on this ground: “the 
present difficulty results from the lack of a congressional mechanism to review 
and act upon the overall government fiscal situation in advance of taking 
appropriation and other legislative actions.”180  In 1973 the House passed 
legislation to control impoundment, as did the Senate (three times).181  But both 
chambers were nervous about enacting their bills into law because voters might 
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interpret them as having an irresponsible pro-spending bias.  The impoundment 
provision had to be attached to a larger bill promising greater congressional 
control over the budget.  In 1974, the Impoundment Control Act became Title X 
of the budget reform act. 
Reformers in 1974 assumed that members of Congress would behave more 
responsibly if they voted explicitly on budget aggregates and faced up to totals, 
rather than decide spending actions in “piecemeal” fashion on separate 
appropriations and legislative bills.  In 1974, as now, it was difficult to defend 
fragmentation, splintering, and decentralization when reformers pressed eagerly 
for “coordination,” “coherence,” and a “unified budget process.” 
The model of the executive budget looked appealing.  The Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921 assumed that presidential control and responsibility 
would be improved if the budget process was centralized in the executive branch.  
There has been no retreat from that principle for the President, but advantages for 
the Chief Executive do not necessarily carry over to Congress.  The risks are 
high when Congress, possessing very different institutional qualities, tries to 
emulate the executive branch. 
The Budget Act of 1974 anticipated a contest between two budgets: 
presidential and congressional.  The analogy is weak because the President is 
head of the executive branch, which is fortified by a central budget office.  There 
is no head in Congress, and there could be no comparable powers for a 
congressional budget office.  Congress is inherently centralized between two 
chambers, two parties, and various appropriation, authorization, and tax 
committees.  No amount of procedural tinkering can hide that reality. 
Yet these considerations, reasonable as they are, did not stop the march 
toward comprehensiveness in Congress.  The 1974 statute created Budget 
Committees in each House and made them responsible for reporting budget 
resolutions with five aggregates: total budget authority, total outlays, total 
revenues, the surplus or deficit, and public debt.  Adoption of a budget resolution 
would guide the individual efforts of authorization, appropriation, and tax 
committees.  The Budget Act established the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) to give legislators technical support. 
The new procedures and organization mandated by the 1974 legislation 
looked impressive on the surface, but there was no guarantee that comprehensive 
action by Congress would yield more responsibility or heightened accountability.  
Increasing the size of a legislative vehicle—from an appropriations bill to a 
budget resolution—could introduce new, unanticipated problems.  It is difficult 
enough to pass individual appropriations, tax, and entitlement bills.  
Compromises and delicate tradeoffs must be fashioned to build majority support. 
Why would it be any easier to pass a comprehensive budget resolution, 
where all parties would seek to have their interests included?  Such a step 
magnifies the scope of legislative conflict and encourages additional concessions 
to members and interest groups.  As the cost of doing business in Congress 
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increases, so does the need for obfuscation and deception.  That has been one of 
the major lessons since 1974.  When legislative conflict exceeds a certain point, 
the result is escapist budgeting.  Members become less, not more, responsible.  
By centralizing the legislative process, the Budget Act of 1974 made it more 
difficult to pass a budget and increased the likelihood of political deadlock.182  
The larger the legislative vehicle, the harder to attract a majority.  As noted by 
John Gilmour, the “genius of the old [pre-1974] practice of considering the 
budget only in pieces, never as a whole, was that it minimized the possibility of 
stalemate.183 
During hearings in 1990, former CBO Director Rudolph Penner remarked 
that Congress seemed to function more responsibly under the former 
decentralized, informal system than under the more comprehensive procedures 
of the 1974 statute: 
I have always been struck by the fact that in looking at the history of the 
[budget] process that it appeared chaotic in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, but the results were very good in terms of budget discipline, yielding 
balanced budgets or surpluses most of the time, unless there was really a good 
reason to run a deficit. 
  Now we have a process that looks very elegant on paper, but it is leading 
to very dishonest and disorderly results.  It is my strong feeling that, while 
Gramm-Rudman may have done some good in reducing the deficit as we 
measure it, it has also done an enormous amount of harm in spawning a large 
number of gimmicks that make it very difficult to analyze the budget 
anymore. . . . 
  . . . I am one of those public policy analysts who thought the 1974 process 
was a good idea when it was first invented.  I have to confess to a lot of 
disappointment and frustration as to how it actually worked out.  I think the 
criticism of that process, that it was too complex and too time consuming, are 
right on the mark. . . .184 
The appropriations committees found it difficult to argue against 
amendments that proposed additional spending when their bills were below the 
amount allowed in a budget resolution.  Allocations in budget resolutions created 
a new incentive or rationale for higher spending.  Instead of reporting bills with 
less money than the President had reported (the previous pattern), the choice was 
now to spend “up to” the figure inserted in the budget resolution.  A chief clerk 
of an appropriations subcommittee complained that the spending limits in a 
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budget resolution had been set too high: “We were faced with pressure to spend 
up to the full budget resolution.  It’s almost as if the Budget Committee bent 
over backwards to give Appropriations all that it wanted and then some.”185  
Because of these calculations, the Budget Act legitimized spending that would 
not have occurred under the previous system.186 
B. Reagan’s 1981 Initiative and Gramm-Rudman 
Budget resolutions were praised because they represented a vehicle for 
centralized, systematic, and coherent legislative action—all intended to 
strengthen Congress.  Under some condition, however, the process of passing a 
budget resolution could strengthen the President.  Those conditions materialized 
in 1981 when President Reagan attracted the necessary votes to gain control over 
the budget resolution in both Houses.  The budget resolution became the 
blueprint for enforcing Reagan’s priorities for a tax cut, defense buildup, and 
retrenchment of domestic programs.  The budget resolution therefore advanced 
presidential, not congressional, goals.  Once the White House had seized control 
of the budget resolution, which embodied its overall budget strategy, subsequent 
action on the tax bill, appropriations bills, and the reconciliation bill became the 
necessary steps to implement presidential policy.  When Reagan’s theory of 
supply-side economics failed to generate predicted revenues, the nation faced 
budget deficits of $150 billion to $200 billion a year.  At the time President 
Reagan entered office, the national debt (accumulated since 1789) stood at 
approximately $1 trillion. In his first four years that number doubled and by the 
time he left office it had climbed to $3 trillion. 
Would the actions in 1981 have happened without a budget resolution?  
Possibly, but Reagan would have faced almost insurmountable hurdles in trying 
to enact his radical program with the pre-1974 budgetary process.  Most likely 
his program would have been chopped to bits by successive committee and 
subcommittee action.  The incrementalism of the decentralized process that 
existed before 1974 would have functioned as an effective brake on extreme 
proposals.  Budget analysts generally agree with this assessment.187 
The budget resolution gave Reagan the centralizing vehicle he needed.  
David Stockman, Reagan’s OMB Director, explained how the centralized 
congressional budget process became a convenient instrument for implementing 
White House goals.  By gaining control of the budget resolution, Congress 
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would be reduced to the status “of a ministerial arm of the White House” and 
would have to “forfeit its independence.”188 
The danger of permitting a President, or the executive branch, this much 
control over Congress is reflected in Stockman’s own assessment of the 
expertise available in the White House and OMB.  After leaving office he 
admitted: “a plan for radical and abrupt change required deep comprehension—
and we had none of it.”189  He conceded that he had “built an edifice of doctrine, 
but not a theory of governance.”190 
For those who associate the executive branch with expertise and objectivity, 
take a look at a key decision on the 1981 budget.  It was well know within the 
White House that the initial allocation of a 9 percent annual growth rate for the 
Defense Department was unacceptably high, especially with the large tax cut.  In 
order to prevent large deficits, it was necessary to pare back the increase to 5 or 7 
percent.  On September 9, 1981, Stockman met for a “shootout” with President 
Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.  After some discussion, 
Weinberger unveiled a large chart showing three cartoon characters representing 
different defense budgets: the Carter budget (a tiny soldier without a rifle), the 
Stockman budget (a bespectacled little soldier holding a small wooden rifle), and 
the Weinberger budget (a big, square-jawed, fully-armed GI Joe).  Weinberger 
got his 9 percent.191  Imagine the ridicule that would have been directed at a 
congressional committee that analyzed a national security issue in this fashion. 
The record of 1981 exposed serious weaknesses within Congress.  Instead of 
depending on its supposedly superior analytical capability gained from the 1974 
statute, including CBO and the Budget Committees, Congress embraced the 
administration’s flawed and false premises.  What explains the continued support 
for the 1974 statute?  Congressman Trent Lott (R-Miss.) put it this way in 1985: 
“The primary reason is that it is worthwhile politically.  Members of Congress 
use the budget process to give the appearance that they are doing something 
about the deficits or dealing with the budget.  In my judgment, they are using it 
as political cover so that they can continue to be fiscally irresponsible.”192 
The astonishing growth of budget deficits after 1981 paved the way for the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act of 1985.  Beginning with a deficit of 
$171.9 billion for fiscal 1986, the statute promised steady decreases over a five-
year period to yield a balanced budget by fiscal 1991.  Of course it failed to 
deliver.  The fact that Congress enacted this bill meant that lawmakers had no 
faith that the process created by the 1974 budget act could deal with deficits in 
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the range of $200 billion a year.  Instead of helping matters, GRH led to 
continued increases in budget deficits and a further loss of accountability.  
Budgeting escapism reached new heights of ingenuity.193  Allen Schick offered 
this judgment: “GRH started out as a process for reducing the deficit and has 
become a means of hiding the deficit and running away from responsibility.”194 
Representative Marty Russo (D-Ill.), member of the House Budget 
Committee, explained how the two branches regularly practiced deceit with 
budget deficits: “The President submits a budget that relies on very optimistic 
economic and technical assumptions and questionable savings proposals to meet 
the Gramm-Rudman deficit target.  Congress attacks the assumptions and 
proposals as phony, but uses them in the budget resolution anyway.”195  
Congress accepted the President’s phony figures because honest numbers (which 
were available) would have increased the projected deficit and made Congress 
look like the “big spender.”  Once the President ducked responsibility by 
submitting a dishonest budget, politics required Congress to embrace the same 
mistaken assumptions. 
Various versions of GRH relied on a combination of legislative and 
executive agencies to implement the budget cuts needed to reduce the deficit: 
CBO, GAO, and OMB.  Congressman Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) protested this 
transfer of power to unelected officials: “We cannot delegate our authority to 
make laws to CBO or OMB or GAO or even to the President.  The drafters of 
the Constitution most fundamentally wanted the voters to have a say in who 
makes laws and wanted the voters to be able to get to these elected 
representatives.”196  Congressman James Scheuer (D-N.Y.) agreed that Congress 
“should not place the ultimate authority for budgetary matters in the hands of 
unelected bureaucrats at OMB, GAO, and CBO who don’t directly represent the 
will of the people.”197  Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) remarked that “this 
process represents the most significant abdication of the responsibility of 
Congress to determine the fiscal priorities of the Nation that I have seen in my 33 
years on Capitol Hill.”198 
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In 1986, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the transfer of 
executive power to the Comptroller General.199  When it became obvious that the 
deficit targets of GRH could not be reached, the two branches enacted a law in 
1987 known as Gramm-Rudman II.  The new statute pushed the fantasy back by 
two years, anticipating a deficit of zero by fiscal 1993.  The deficit for that year 
came in at $255 billion.200 
In 1990, Congress and President Bush agreed to abandon fixed deficit 
targets.  Instead, by placing caps on spending and increasing taxes, they hoped 
that deficits would decline over the years.  The caps were extended in 1993 along 
with additional tax increases.  In 1997, spending caps were combined with a 
modest tax cut.  As a result of these actions and a healthy economy, fiscal 1998 
actually closed with a small surplus.   
Spending caps signal many things.  They are meant to demonstrate discipline 
and constraint, but they also reveal that lawmakers have no faith in the regular 
legislative process or the budget statute of 1974.  If members remain under the 
caps, they can claim that they lived within established boundaries.  But if caps 
are set at generous levels (as they have been), they invite spending that might not 
have occurred.  Caps encourage legislators to spend up to the limit.  Caps can 
also be broken whenever members of Congress decide it is necessary, as they did 
in 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
C. The Push for an Item Veto 
Because of the phenomenal increase in deficits in the 1980s, members of 
Congress began to debate measures to increase the President’s power to rescind 
(cancel) appropriated funds.  This was a strange development.  Because the 
President had submitted an irresponsible budget proposal in 1981 that led to 
intolerable annual deficits, Congress decided to reward the President with 
additional powers. 
In 1984, the Senate debated a proposal that would allow the President to 
item-veto appropriations bills, subject to a legislative override of a majority of 
each chamber instead of the two-thirds required by the Constitution.201  It 
appeared that a majority of the Senate would support this measure, even though 
(or perhaps precisely because) it would invite a court case.  Senator Pete 
Domenici (R-N.M.) disagreed that “something as patently unconstitutional as 
this ought to be passed” and tossed to the courts for resolution.202  It was only 
when Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) raised a point of order “that the bill is 
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legislation which changes the Constitution of the United States” that the measure 
was derailed.203 
Some members of Congress urged Presidents Reagan and Bush to exercise 
an “inherent item veto.”  Under this curious theory, the Constitution—ever since 
1789—has included an item veto, although no one noticed it until the 1980s, 
when an op-ed piece appeared in the Wall Street Journal.204  Advocates of the 
inherent item veto argued that the passage of “omnibus” bills by Congress had so 
eroded the President’s original veto power that the President was justified, as an 
action of self-defense, in vetoing individual items.  However, omnibus 
appropriations bills have been with us from the beginning,205 and it was 
President Washington’s understanding in 1793 that the Constitution required him 
to “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.”206 
Despite the dubious legitimacy of the inherent item veto, four Senators and 
48 House members in 1991 urged Bush to try it and provoke a test case in 
court.207  The next year, Bush finally announced that his legal advisers had 
convinced him that there was no legal support for an inherent item veto.208  The 
controversy continued into the Clinton administration, when the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on a Senate resolution encouraging the President to use 
the inherent item veto and let the dispute be settled in the courts.209  Bottom line: 
members of Congress should transfer legislative power to the President and see 
whether courts will return the power to Congress.  But each branch is supposed 
to protect its own prerogatives. 
From 1985 to 1995, Congress held a series of hearings to explore different 
ways of granting the President some form of expanded impoundment power.  In 
debating these measures, lawmakers wallowed in institutional self-flagellation.  
On the issue of transferring the item veto to the President, House Minority 
Leader Bob Michel (R-Ill.) said in 1993 that he would be asked: “Bob, why 
would you give up your legislative authority to an all-powerful chief executive?”  
His response: “Because we have loused it up here in the Congress.  That’s 
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why.”210  The previous year, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) supported the item 
veto because “controlling spending is something that the Congress is completely 
unable to do.”211 
When the Republicans took control of Congress in 1995, they had the votes 
to enact item-veto legislation.  Senator Dan Coats (R-Ind.) argued that 
presidential power had to be increased to compensate for legislative 
irresponsibility.  Congress, he said, “cannot discipline itself. . . . [I]t is selfish and 
greedy and out of touch with the American people [and] cannot put the national 
interest ahead of parochial interests or special interests.”212  The two Houses 
finally agreed on what is known as “enhanced rescission.”  The new law put the 
burden on Congress to disapprove presidential rescission proposals within a 30-
day period.  Along with rescission of discretionary appropriations, the President 
could cancel any new item of direct spending (entitlements) and certain limited 
tax benefits.  Clinton received the bill and signed into law the Line Item Veto 
Act of 1996.213 
As though uncertain about the legality of their own handiwork, members of 
Congress included a procedure allowing for expedited review in the courts for 
challenges that the statute violated the Constitution.214  Some legislators 
expected the judiciary to protect legislative prerogatives.  Marge Roukema (R-
N.J.) said she was convinced “that the Supreme Court of the United States will 
save this Congress from itself.”215  Bill Clinger, Republican from Pennsylvania 
and chairman of the House committee with jurisdiction over the item-veto bill, 
offered this response to those who objected that the bill was unconstitutional: “It 
is not really our job to determine what is constitutional or what is not 
unconstitutional.”216  In 1998, the Court held that the Line Item Veto Act 
violated the Presentment Clause by departing from the “finely wrought” 
constitutional procedures established for the enactment of law.  Cancellation 
authority, said the Court, represented the repeal of law that could be 
accomplished only through the regular legislative process, including 
bicameralism and presentment.217 
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If Congress wants to transfer to the President discretionary authority over the 
level of federal expenditures, there are many constitutional ways of doing that.  
Enactment of these proposals, however, would come at a cost.  They continue to 
send a not very subtle message that members of Congress are chronically and 
incurably irresponsible in exercising their legislative duties and must rely on the 
finer, nobler instincts of the President to delete wasteful programs and projects.  
That picture of our political institutions is not supported by what we know about 
the two branches.  It is too demeaning to Congress (and representative 
government) and too flattering and reverential about the presidency. 
D. More Congressional Self-Reproach 
In the years following World War II, Congress revealed other uncertainties 
about its institutional purpose and capability.  Functions that had been 
discharged from 1789 to 1950 now seemed increasingly difficult to do, 
prompting legislators to seek relief by novel statutory procedures or by amending 
the Constitution.  Three examples are the chronic problems of raising 
congressional pay and debate over constitutional amendments for a balanced 
budget and for term limits. 
The Constitution provides that Senators and Representatives “shall receive a 
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the 
Treasury of the United States.”218  In implementing this provision, legislators 
throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth century found it awkward 
and excruciating to raise their own salaries, but that is what the Constitution 
requires.219 
These were gruesome experiences for lawmakers, but by one means or 
another they managed to raise their pay periodically from 1789 to the 1960s.  
Soon, however, they began to look for automatic increases that would not 
depend on legislative action.  In 1967, Congress established a commission to 
recommend every four years the rates of compensation for members of 
Congress, Justices of the Supreme Court, federal judges, and certain high-
ranking government officials.  The President, after receiving these 
recommendations, would submit to Congress his own proposals for salaries.  
They would take effect within 30 days unless disapproved by either House or 
replaced by a different salary schedule enacted into law.220  Legislation in 1970 
adopted a similar scheme, allowing for increases in federal salaries unless either 
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House disapproved within 30 days.221  Of course if Congress did not act the 
salary increases would take effect. 
The history of federal pay in the 1970s and 1980s found legislators 
entangled in painful roll call votes and deft parliamentary maneuvers, writhing 
again and again over their compensation and the salaries of executive and 
judicial officials.  The pay issue continued to dog Congress.  In 1989, in one of 
his last official actions, President Reagan recommended a 51 percent salary hike 
for members of Congress.  The huge increase was needed because regular (and 
more modest) pay increases had been repeatedly blocked by Congress.  The 
increase was scheduled to take effect on February 8 unless both Houses voted to 
disapprove.  Constituents and the media heaped scorn on lawmakers for seeking 
a salary increase without taking a vote.  Having absorbed a public beating for 
several weeks, Congress created the worst of all worlds by deciding to 
disapprove the pay increase (not only for themselves but for all of government).  
Congressman Vic Fazio (D-Cal.), one of the few to vote for the pay raise, 
expressed regret at the inability of legislators to defend themselves: 
 . . . if we are to have any success when we ultimately come to the floor with 
solutions to these problems, we are going to need more self-respect for 
ourselves and respect for the institution. 
  We are going to need to show some courage individually.  We no longer 
are going to be in a position to hand this problem to some process or some 
person and assume it will be taken care of for us.  We are going to have to 
venture something of ourselves if we are going to make any progress.222 
The House and the Senate voted on February 7 to kill the pay raise.223  So much 
for clever delegations and automatic procedures.  Legislation enacted at the end 
of 1989 now requires Congress to approve, by recorded vote, pay increases.224 
The proposal for a balanced budget amendment is another advertisement that 
Congress is irresponsible and cannot be trusted.  Instead of confronting and 
resolving fiscal problems within their own institution, some lawmakers hope to 
place coercive language in the Constitution to compel Congress to act 
responsibly.  As Congressman Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.) noted in 1995: 
Madame Speaker, Congress has repeatedly shown that it is not prepared to deal 
responsibly with the problems without some kind of a prod.  The enactment of 
a balanced budget amendment will help to give Congress—and this is the 
point—it will help to give Congress that prod, that spine, that backbone and, 
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for some who need it, the excuse to do what the American people have to do, 
and that is to live within means.225 
The amendment would do little to balance the budget and do much to 
unbalance political institutions.  It would increase presidential power and shift a 
number of fiscal and budgetary decisions to federal judges.  In turn, it would 
weaken Congress and representative government and further erode public 
confidence in elected officials.  Citizens would discover what we have learned 
about state constitutional amendments for a balanced budget: They do not 
eliminate indebtedness. 
States do not live within their means.  They borrow.  If states spent only 
when they took in as revenues, there would be no need for the limits on 
indebtedness that we see placed in state constitutions.  Nor would we hear of 
state and municipal bond offerings, or states worrying about their bond ratings.  
States do not “balance their budgets.”  They balance their operating (or general) 
budgets and run debts on their capital budgets.  Over the years, states have 
devised a number of techniques for creating and concealing debts. 
A balanced budget amendment is likely to increase presidential powers over 
the budget.  At the state level, governors use balanced-budget requirements to 
justify greater power over spending by invoking item-veto authority, impounding 
funds, or shifting expenditures into the next fiscal year.  With a balanced budget 
requirement for the national government, pressure would mount to extend those 
same powers to the President, exercised either as inherent authorities or as 
delegated by statute to the President.  The amendment would also transfer a 
number of sensitive fiscal decisions to federal judges, with little expectation that 
the courts have the competence (technical or political) to discharge these new 
duties.226 
Finally, the power and prestige of Congress would suffer when citizens 
learned that Congress could promise a balanced budget but could not deliver.  
All the tricks for escaping the deficit targets embodied in the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act would be dwarfed by new heights of accounting ingenuity.  If 
citizens want government benefits without being taxed for them, Congress will 
find ways to disguise the deficit.  Instead of dealing with a deficit of known size, 
honestly displayed, the incentive would be to paper it over, push it underground, 
and shove it to the future.  This result would deepen public cynicism and 
disrespect for the national legislature.  Large deficits in the annual budgets 
threaten the nation.  So do deficits of trust in our governmental institutions. 
Arguments for an item veto and a balanced budget amendment rest on the 
belief that Congress is irresponsible and unworthy of trust.  Similarly, term limits 
are designed to get rid of lawmakers supposedly corrupted by lengthy service.  
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The clear message: “Members of Congress are not honest.  The longer they 
serve, the worse they get.”  The punitive spirit behind the proposal is reflected in 
the title of a book published in 1994 by John Armor: Why Term Limits?  Because 
They Have It Coming! 
Public support for term limits seemed to ignore its impact on the 
constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches.  Turning 
members of Congress into citizen-legislators with short terms would give them 
little stake in protecting legislative interests, and it would weaken their power to 
protect those interests even if they wanted to.  Power would flow from Congress 
to the White House, political appointees, and members of the career bureaucracy.  
Congressman Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
broke with his party on this issue, refusing to participate in the “dumbing down 
of democracy.”227 
With Congress weakened in relation to the executive branch, lawmakers 
would become more, not less, dependent on the expertise eagerly offered by 
interest groups and lobbyists.  Far from eliminating or reducing corruption, term 
limits are more likely to exacerbate the problem.  Unable to look forward to a 
career in Congress, lawmakers are likely to view lobbyists not merely as sources 
of information but as potential employers.  Congressman Tony Beilenson (D-
Cal.) said that because of the six-year term limit in his state, “legislators come 
into office looking for ways to use their short stint to make their next career 
move.”228 
In 1997, Congressman Hyde reflected on the reason behind the drive for 
term limits: “The popularity of term limits is a measure of the low esteem our 
citizens have for politics and politicians.  Some of my colleagues may think that 
is fine.  I think it is dangerous.”  He said that because of the way members of 
Congress “attack each other and the way we demean this institution in every 
campaign, it is no wonder we are held in contempt.”229 
VI. STRENGTHENING OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
After protecting congressional war and spending prerogatives from 1789 to 
1950, why have lawmakers agreed to transfer power to the President in 
wholesale lots?  Congress remains a strong and independent branch in many 
areas—capable of retaining close control over executive agencies and the 
President—but in the domains of war and spending it has not acted with 
confidence, self-respect, or institutional courage.  At stake is not just 
congressional prerogatives but representative government. 
Some argue that the framers’ model was appropriate for the eighteenth 
century but not for contemporary times, when it is claimed that greater power 
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must be concentrated in the President.  The framers also lived in a time of crises 
and emergencies and deliberately chose to vest in Congress the core powers of 
war and spending. 
Why should citizens care if Congress continues to defer to the President?  
Why not let Congress remain comfortably and passively in the back seat?  There 
would be some justice to that.  However, a weak Congress undermines the public 
control and democratic values that operate through a representative branch.  
What steps might citizens and Congress take to restore constitutional checks? 
A. Constitutional Law 101 
Few members of Congress seem to have much understanding of the 
prerogatives they are expected to exercise and defend.  After decades of 
Presidents claiming that they can do anything they want as Commander-in-
Chief, and after decades of Congress, the public, and the media pretending that 
the President is a more trusted guardian of the purse, it is little wonder that 
lawmakers have become accustomed to a subordinate role. 
A few years ago I gave a talk on war powers at a law school.  I had hardly 
begun when a second year law student cut me off, with palpable irritation in his 
voice, by asking: “Doesn’t the Constitution give the President the power to 
declare war, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate?”  For a moment my 
supposedly involuntary breathing system failed me.  Did he say what I thought 
he said?  Could a second year law student be that unaware of the text of the 
Constitution?  I moved from those musings to a broader thought.  Evidently the 
student had not manufactured this off-the-wall idea.  He picked it up somewhere 
from the press, from friends, and other sources.  I was not in the midst of a 
unique and original misreading of the Constitution.  Disturbingly, he reflected 
something deeper. 
Early in 1999, on a drive home from work, I listened to a speech that former 
President George Bush was giving to the Senate.  He discussed the difficulty in 
1990 of developing a consensus with Congress about the need to take military 
action against Saddam Hussein.  I heard him say there was a difference of 
opinion about who had the power to declare war.  Had I heard him correctly?  
Since the Constitution clearly decides that issue, how could it still be unsettled in 
his mind?  Had Bush ad-libbed and strayed from the text of his speech?  No.  I 
got a copy of his speech and the language was unambiguous: “there was a 
fundamental difference of opinion between the Senate and the White House over 
the Senate’s role in declaring war—one that dated back to the War Powers 
Act.”230  Of course the issue dates back much earlier (to the Constitution) and it 
is not the Senate’s but the Congress’s role “to declare war.”231  Ignorance by a 
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law student is one thing.  To hear a former (and recent) President stumble on 
such a fundamental point is much more alarming. 
I am constantly surprised by arguments put forward by some members of 
Congress.  Increasingly I hear them say that Congress may not use the power of 
the purse to prevent a President from using military force against another  
country.  They say that only after the President orders troops into combat would 
it be constitutionally permissible for Congress to deny funds.  There is no basis 
for that position.  If there was, legislators would be fighting a rear guard battle, 
trying to exercise control after the President had made crucial military and 
financial commitments.  Members may restrict a President’s actions 
prospectively as well as retrospectively.  Nothing prohibits Congress from 
passing legislation to deny funds for something the President is about to do.  If 
such a statutory restriction were somehow challenged in court, there is every 
reason to believe that courts would uphold it. 
The system of checks and balances applies as much to military policy (if not 
more so) as to domestic policy.  We cannot expect foreign policy and national 
security to be formulated well in the hands of an unchecked Executive.  In a 
speech in 1998, Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) pointed to the value of 
joint action by Congress and the President: “I believe that a partnership, 
characterized by creative tension between the President and the Congress, 
produces a foreign policy that better serves the American national interest—and 
better reflects the values of the American people—than policy produced by the 
President alone.”232 
The contemporary President benefits from some new developments.  One is 
the volunteer army.  During the Vietnam War years, citizens protested by 
burning their draft cards, refusing induction, fleeing to Canada, and participating 
in mass demonstrations.  With the current volunteer army, the passions and 
outlets for civil disobedience seem mooted.  College campuses, once vigorous 
centers of opposition to the Vietnam War, are largely silent.  As Joseph Califano 
has noted, an all-volunteer army “relieves affluent, vocal, voting Americans of 
the concern that their children will be at risk of going into combat.”233 
Second, military technology now enables Presidents to wage wars with few 
casualties.  During the four days of bombing Iraq in December 1998, not a single 
U.S. or British casualty resulted from 70 hours of intensive airstrikes involving 
650 sorties against nearly 100 targets.234  The following year, President Clinton 
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waged war for eleven weeks against Serbia without a single NATO combat 
casualty. 
Third, the growing cost of running for office means that legislators have less 
time to tend to their institutional duties.  As Congressman Hamilton noted in 
1998: “Members today must spend a disproportionate amount of time 
fundraising, which means less time with constituents discussing the issues and 
less time with colleagues forging legislation and monitoring federal 
bureaucrats.”235  Less time in Washington, D.C., means less time understanding 
legislative prerogatives, less time working with colleagues on like-minded 
issues, and less time forging alliances to fight back against executive 
encroachments. 
B. Constitutional Clichés 
The President’s capacity to conduct war unilaterally expands when 
legislators, members of the public, and the media routinely accept clichés and 
superficial maxims about executive power.  A coequal and independent 
Congress requires that tired, trite axioms be dissected and punctured whenever 
they start to circulate, especially when they parade as received wisdom. 
1. President as “Sole Organ” 
As legal support for broad presidential power, the administration continues 
to cite language from Curtiss-Wright that the President is “sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations.”236  This phrase comes from a speech by 
Congressman John Marshall in 1800.  As explained in Section II-C, Marshall 
never argued that the President was the exclusive policymaker in foreign affairs.  
At no time, either in 1800 or during his long tenure on the Supreme Court, did 
Marshall ever suggest that the President could act unilaterally to make foreign 
policy or military policy in the face of statutory restrictions, nor did he ever 
imply that Presidents could conduct offensive wars on their own authority.  The 
President was “sole organ” in announcing and implementing policy, not in 
making it.  National security policy is formulated through the collective effort of 
the executive and legislative branches, either by treaty or by statute. 
2. The 200 Precedents 
Unilateral presidential actions in committing military troops is often 
defended by referring to the two hundred or so instances in which Presidents 
have used force without congressional authority.237  No doubt one can put 
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together a long list of such precedents, but they do not change the constitutional 
authority of Congress to take the nation from a state of peace to a state of war.  
Take a close look at the precedents: President Monroe’s use of U.S. forces to 
expel a group of smugglers in Florida, the landing of a naval party in Argentina 
in 1890 to protect the U.S. consulate and legation, the chasing of bandits into 
Mexico, and so forth.  Those actions cannot possibly justify Truman’s war 
against Korea, Bush’s operation against Iraq, or Clinton’s bombing of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia. 
3. Stopping Politics at the Water’s Edge 
When President Clinton bombed Iraq in December 1998, the New York 
Times ran an article with this subtitle: “Politics Stop No More At the Water’s 
Edge.”238  Because some legislators questioned Clinton’s motives in ordering the 
attacks the day before the House was scheduled to take up the Articles of 
Impeachment against Clinton, the reporter claimed that the legislators violated 
“Washington’s long-standing political code.  You don’t criticize the President, 
that code says, when American forces stand in harm’s way.”239  There is no such 
code.  As the article itself acknowledged, many Presidents have run into trouble 
on Capitol Hill over foreign policy.  Lyndon Johnson was driven from office for 
his Vietnam policy.  As the reporter notes, Ronald Reagan was accused by some 
members of Congress and editorial writers of “staging the invasion of Grenada to 
mute criticism of his failure to protect marines who were killed in Lebanon.”240  
Stopping politics at the water’s edge is not the practice in America.  Instead, it is 
a formula for a second-class Congress and a muzzled public. 
4. Speaking With One Voice 
In the midst of bombing Yugoslavia in 1999, President Clinton urged that 
“America must continue to speak with a single voice.”241  Stop.  The President is 
not America; he is not the nation.  There is no need to revive Louis XIV’s L’état 
c’est moi.  Nothing is treasonous or disloyal about questioning and disagreeing 
with military actions ordered by the President.  In 1919, a unanimous Supreme 
Court upheld the criminal indictments of individuals who opposed America’s 
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entrance into World War I and spoke out against the draft.242  The “clear and 
present danger” test announced in this decision was followed by the “bad 
tendency” test, which argued that the mere tendency to create evil justifies 
suppression by the government.243  In a penetrating critique in the Harvard Law 
Review, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., argued that it was particularly in time of war that 
public debate must be left free to challenge governmental policy.244 
5. “If We’re In It, Win It” 
Once Clinton began bombing Yugoslavia, some supporters (and previous 
opponents) argued that no matter how ill-advised the military operation might 
have been, once the United States and NATO decided to intervene it was 
necessary to “win” the war.  As a general policy, that makes no sense and has 
never been national strategy.  The United States has been involved in numerous 
military actions without insisting on victory, whatever the cost.  Examples of 
America disengaging from military operations short of a successful outcome 
include Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon in 1983, and Somalia in 1993.  Sometimes 
when we’re in, it is smart to get out, and quickly.  It is not a national disgrace to 
disengage from wrong-headed and ill-fated ventures. 
“If we in it, win it” was the attitude that kept the United States mired in 
Vietnam for years, absorbing huge casualties with no hope of success.  Had the 
United States followed the policy to win a war once engaged, President Kennedy 
would have found himself in an air and ground war in Cuba after the Bay of Pigs 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In both cases he chose a more limited, and more 
successful, strategy.  If we’re in it, we have to decide whether it is in the national 
interest to remain there. 
6. Saving Credibility 
When Clinton made a commitment to send troops to Bosnia in 1995, some 
legislators who had opposed his policy now switched positions and claimed that 
continued resistance would undermine the credibility of the United States, the 
presidency, and NATO.  Similar arguments surfaced with the bombing of Serbia 
in 1999.  Through some mysterious process, a presidential initiative becomes a 
“vital national interest.”  Supporters argued that any effort to renege on Clinton’s 
decision, however misguided it might have been, would undermine the 
credibility of the presidency and NATO.  No doubt the credibility of the 
presidency and NATO is important, but so is the credibility of Congress, the 
Constitution, the system of checks and balances, and popular control.  
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Presidential shortcuts and legislative acquiescence mark the road from 
representative government to autocracy. 
7. “Doing the Right Thing” 
Writing after his presidency, Bush said that had Congress failed to authorize 
the war against Iraq he would have acted anyway, because “it was the right thing 
to do.”  Clinton used precisely the same phrase in justifying his planned invasion 
of Haiti and his interventions in Bosnia and Serbia.  Multibillion dollar 
commitments should not be entered into simply because the President says it is 
the “right thing” and is determined to proceed with or without Congress and with 
or without public support.  That is a superficial foundation for national policy, 
domestic or foreign.  More important than doing the right thing is doing things 
the right way: following constitutional procedures, developing a national 
consensus and public support, and working with the legislative branch instead of 
circumventing it. 
8. Protecting the Troops 
One of the standard arguments in defense of presidential wars is that 
regardless of how deficient the policy might be it is necessary to offer support 
because American troops deserve protection.  That was the position of the Senate 
in 1995 when it passed legislation to support American troops in Bosnia but 
expressed “reservations” about sending them there.  Some legislators even 
suggested that a cutoff of funds would leave American soldiers stranded and 
without ammunition, food, and clothing.  Clearly, that would not be the result.  A 
cutoff of funds means that troops are withdrawn, out of harm’s way.  Military 
commitments need to be examined on their merits.  If the policy cannot be 
defended, it makes no sense to fund it or send American soldiers.  In such 
circumstances the best protection for troops is not to have them there. 
9. “We’ll Consult with Congress” 
Presidents regularly promise to brief legislators and consult with them about 
military commitments.  Cabinet officials, like the Secretary of Defense, speak 
earnestly about the need for an open and frank dialogue between the President 
and Congress.  Many legislators seem mollified by these offers.  Consultation, 
however, is not enough.  Congress is a legislative body and discharges its 
constitutional responsibilities by passing statutes that authorize and define 
national policy.  Congress exists to legislate and legitimate, not to have 
Presidents and executive officials simply touch bases with it. 
10. Word Games 
For the past half century, Presidents and their assistants have resorted to 
word games to justify military adventures, but semantics are a poor substitute for 
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constitutional principle and effective policy.  Truman denied he was “at war” in 
Korea.  It was, instead, a “police action under the United Nations.”  Even federal 
courts, operating at some distance from military issues, found that position 
singularly unpersuasive.  As noted before, Secretary of State Albright was asked 
in 1998 how President Clinton could order military action against Iraq after 
opposing American policy in Vietnam.  Her response: “We are talking about 
using military force, but we are not talking about a war. That is an important 
distinction.”245  Supposedly clever distinctions between war and military force 
do much to undermine democratic and constitutional values.  They eviscerate the 
congressional war power and public control. 
C. The War Powers Resolution 
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is generally considered the high-water 
mark of congressional reassertion in national security affairs.  In fact, it was ill-
conceived and badly compromised from the start, replete with tortured ambiguity 
and self-contradiction.  The statute further subordinates Congress to presidential 
war initiatives and should be repealed in its entirety.246 
Other than genuine emergencies or legitimate measures of defensive action, 
the President should come to Congress in advance for statutory authority.  If he 
must act in a sudden emergency without such authority, he needs to come as 
soon as possible to receive retroactive authority.  In 1995, a conference report 
noted that President Clinton’s initiatives in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and refugee 
relief in the Caribbean “all mark significant departures from previous emergency 
deployments of American forces.”  The conferees expressed the proper 
constitutional principle by stating their “strong belief” that military deployments 
“in support of peacekeeping or humanitarian objectives both merit and require 
advance approval by the Congress.”247 
In 1998, the House passed language to narrow the scope of presidential war 
power.  An amendment, added to the defense appropriations bill, provided that 
no funds appropriated in that act “may be used to initiate or conduct offensive 
military operations” by U.S. armed forces except in accordance with the war 
powers clause of the Constitution, “which vests in Congress the power to declare 
and authorize war.”248  That language was tabled in the other chamber because 
Senators were scrambling to get out of town for the August recess.249  If 
legislators want to reclaim constitutional powers that have drifted to the 
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President and restore Congress as a coequal branch, revisiting this amendment 
with hearings and full legislative debate is a good place to begin. 
When Secretary Albright appeared before the House Appropriations 
Committee in 1998, Congressman David Skaggs (D-Colo.) asked her to explain 
what authority President Clinton possessed to initiate further attacks against Iraq.  
In a statement later supplied to the committee, as an insert for the record, she 
claimed that the President’s constitutional authority as commander in chief 
allowed him “to use armed forces to protect our national interests.”250  That is a 
startling interpretation.  Whenever the President determines, on his own, that a 
matter is in the national interest, he may use military force against another nation 
without ever seeking authority from Congress.  Nothing in the Constitution 
supports that claim of power. 
D. Behaving Like a Coequal Branch 
During President Reagan’s first year in office, Interior Secretary James Watt 
withheld documents from a House subcommittee, provoking a committee 
subpoena for the documents and a recommendation by the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce that Watt be cited for contempt.  Attorney General William 
French Smith claimed that “all of the documents in issue are either necessary and 
fundamental to the deliberative process presently ongoing in the Executive 
Branch or relate to sensitive foreign policy considerations.”251 
In fact, the dispute with Watt concerned the impact of Canadian investment 
and energy policies on American commerce, an issue squarely within the Article 
I enumerated power of Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”  
The Justice Department seemed to have difficulty reading, much less following, 
the text of the Constitution.  As the controversy escalated upward to a contempt 
citation, the documents were released to the committee.252 
In 1996, the Justice Department issued a memorandum objecting to two 
statutes that concerned the rights of federal employees to provide information to 
Congress.  Both statutory provisions gave executive employees a right to furnish 
information to either House of Congress or to a committee.  The Justice memo 
claimed that a congressional enactment “would be unconstitutional if it were 
interpreted to divest the President of his control over national security 
information in the Executive Branch by vesting lower-ranking personnel in that 
Branch with a ‘right’ to furnish such information to a Member of Congress 
without receiving official authorization to do so.”  In defending this position, the 
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Justice Department cited a number of presidential roles, including Commander 
in Chief, head of the executive branch, and “sole organ” of the nation in its 
external relations.253  I prepared a memo, detailing the deficiencies in the Justice 
Department analysis. 
In order to examine the position of the Justice Department, the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence held two days of hearings in 1998.  Professor Peter 
Raven-Hansen of the George Washington University law school and I appeared 
the first day to rebut the Department’s position that the President has ultimate 
and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination of 
national security information.  On the second day of hearings, I testified 
alongside a representative of the Justice Department.254 
Based on these hearings and its own independent staff analysis, the 
committee reported legislation despite claims by the Justice Department that the 
bill was an unconstitutional invasion of presidential prerogatives.  The 
committee acted unanimously, voting nineteen to zero to report the bill.255  The 
bipartisan vote for legislative prerogatives was solid.  The Senate report said that 
the administration’s “intransigence on this issue compelled the Committee to 
act.”256  The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 93 to one.257  The House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence took a different approach in 
drafting legislation, but also rejected the administration’s claim that the President 
exercised exclusive control over national security information.  I testified before 
the House committee as well.258  Like the Senate, the House committee 
dismissed the assertion that the President, as Commander in Chief, “has ultimate 
and unimpeded constitutional authority over national security, or classified, 
information.  Rather, national security is a constitutional responsibility shared by 
the executive and legislative branches that proceeds according to the principles 
and practices of comity.”259  The two committees reported and enacted 
legislation with this language: “national security is a shared responsibility, 
requiring joint efforts and mutual respect by Congress and the President.”260  The 
statute further provides that Congress, “as a co-equal branch of Government, is 
empowered by the Constitution to serve as a check on the executive branch; in 
that capacity, it has ‘a need to know’ of allegations of wrongdoing within the 
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executive branch, including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence 
Community.”261 
Dozens of war-power issues have been litigated since World War II.  The 
trend in recent decades is for members of Congress to take these disputes to 
court, hoping that a judge will agree with their constitutional interpretation.  But 
there is little reason to think that these member cases will be successful.  Courts 
have made it plain that they are loath to decide such cases, because just as one 
group of members will claim that the President has violated the Constitution, so 
will another group claim that he has acted properly.  Judges don’t want to be in 
the middle of this intramural crossfire.  They will not referee a case unless the 
two branches are in irresolute conflict and the entire Congress has made use of 
the institutional remedies available to it.  If members want to protect their 
institution, they must take the time to forge a majority capable of doing battle 
against the President. 
E. The Spending Power 
Rather than duck accountability on spending issues and heap blame on their 
institution, legislators can point to the clear record that they generally remain 
within the budget aggregates proposed by the President.  Having established 
their fiscal bona fides, they are then in a position to participate fully in deciding 
how the totals are to be spent.  Under these conditions, there is no need to 
delegate cancellation or other spending powers to the President, and no need to 
construct a complicated budget process for the purpose of convincing the public 
that they can act “comprehensively.” 
It would put executive-legislative relations in better perspective if we 
acknowledged the obvious: Presidents are just as good as Congress in promoting 
and originating expensive programs.  In fact, they are probably better.  Really big 
programs are likely to come from the President: the supercollider, the strategic 
defense initiative (Star Wars), and the Clinton health plan of 1993.  Presidents 
are more apt to complain about Congress cutting programs than adding to them. 
The media helps foster the notion of an irresponsible Congress.  An article 
on page A18 of the New York Times on September 9, 1999, has this arresting 
title: “Lawmakers’ Spending Plans Could Turn Surplus to Deficit.”  How many 
readers will go much beyond the headline?  The gist of the story is that the 
Republicans planned additional spending to wipe out a projected $14 billion 
surplus for the next year and create in its place an $11 billion deficit.  A $25 
billion swing is quite a lot, suggesting that an undisciplined Congress is solely 
responsible for turning a good situation into a bad one. 
An industrious reader could locate another story, on page A1 of the same 
paper, with the title “Lott Says Veto Is Likely to Kill Tax Cut in ‘99.’”  Doesn’t 
seem to have anything to do with spending, but of course it does.  The 
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Republicans proposed a $792 billion tax cut but President Clinton promised to 
veto anything of that size.  Instead, he wanted a tax cut of about $300 billion in 
order to direct more funds to education, a prescription drug program for the 
elderly, and other domestic programs.  His list of new spending initiatives was 
much longer, and more expensive, than what the Republicans had in mind.  The 
headline could just as well have been: “Clinton’s Spending Plans Could Turn 
Surplus to Deficit.”  But it wasn’t. 
A month later, Clinton threatened to veto the Republican foreign aid bill 
because it provided $1.9 billion less that he requested.  When Republicans 
considered a plan to cut spending 2.7 percent across-the-board, the White House 
was quick to denounce the plan for requiring devastating reductions in education, 
health, transportation, and other domestic programs.262  Congress had to settle 
for an across-the-board cut of 0.39 percent.  With Clinton threatening to shut the 
government down unless he got additional funds, Republicans accommodated 
his demands by including several billion to hire more teachers and police and to 
acquire western desert and ranch land as part of Clinton’s “Land Legacy” 
program.263 
The State of the Union Message has become a major showcase for 
presidential largesse.  Prior to the release of the message, newspaper stories carry 
leaks from the administration, explaining how the President will first benefit this 
group and next that group.  When President Clinton gave his State of the Union 
Message in January 1999, it was studded with new spending and tax initiatives.  
He proposed a new pension initiative to use a little over 11 percent of the surplus 
to establish Universal Savings Accounts to give all Americans the means to save.  
Next came a tripling of funding for summer school and after-school programs, 
$200 million “to help States turn around their own failing schools,” a six-fold 
increase in college scholarships for students who commit to teach in the inner 
cities and isolated rural areas and in Indian communities, building or 
modernizing 5,000 schools, and raising the minimum wage by $1 an hour over 
the next two years.  Clinton also proposed changes in the tax code that would 
reduce federal revenue: tax credits of $1,000 for the aged, ailing, or disabled; tax 
credits and subsidies for working families and for expanded after-school 
programs; and a new tax credit for stay-at-home parents.  He asked Congress for 
“a dramatic increase in Federal support for adult literacy” and proposed a 28 
percent increase in long-term computing research. 
Turning to national security, he asked for an increase in funding by almost 
two thirds over the next five years to keep terrorists from disrupting computer 
networks, to prepare local communities for biological and chemical emergencies, 
to support research into vaccines and treatments, and to restrain the spread of 
nuclear weapons.  He called for a “sustained increase” over the next six years for 
 
 262. House Narrowly Passes Foreign Aid Measure, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1999, at A6, A7. 
 263. Spending Agreement Eludes Negotiators, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at A4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
60 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:7 
readiness, for modernization, and for pay and benefits for U.S. troops and their 
families. 
Clinton said his budget would expand support for drug testing and treatment 
and contain two new initiatives: a $1 billion Liability Agenda to help 
communities save open space, ease traffic congestion and grow in ways “that 
enhance every citizen’s quality of life,” and a $1 billion Lands Legacy Initiative 
to preserve places of natural beauty across America.264  These and other 
presidential proposals dwarf the projects that members of Congress attempt to 
steer toward their communities. 
F. The Price of Centralization 
Congress could profitably rethink the merits of the Budget Act of 1974.  
Even when a process is crippled and dysfunctional, it’s not easy or comfortable 
to kick away crutches.  But there is good reason to doubt that budget resolutions 
are an important discipline for enforcing overall budget decisions.  It is probably 
more true that they obscure accountability, invite greater spending, and open the 
door to greater presidential leverage, as happened in 1981.  Centralized 
procedures in Congress do not automatically yield benefits or improvements.   
Centralizing the budgeting process in 1974 has led to less participation by 
members of Congress.  Put another way, voters and constituents now have less 
influence through their representatives.  There has been an increasing trend 
toward “summit meetings” that include a handful of executive and legislative 
leaders to hammer out the final details of a budget plan.  The $500 billion 
omnibus appropriations bill in 1998 included eight appropriations bills, 
supplemental appropriations, emergency appropriations, a tax cut, and a number 
of authorization bills.  Toward the end of the process, key negotiations were 
conducted by White House representatives and four legislators: Speaker 
Gingrich, House Minority Leader Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Lott, and 
Senate Minority Leader Daschle. 
Republican rank-and-file, and even more senior lawmakers, resented the 
budget summit in 1995 that included only Republican leaders and White House 
officials.265  Similar criticism was directed at Speaker Gingrich in 1997 for 
making budget decisions without including a sufficient number of other 
Republican lawmakers.266  In the fall of 1998, Republicans presented Clinton 
with a single omnibus appropriations bill instead of the 13 individual 
appropriations bills.  He was thus ideally positioned to threaten a veto and force 
another shutdown of government (with the public most likely to blame the 
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Republicans) unless he received funding increases for various domestic 
programs.267  Republican leaders once again walked into a trap they helped 
set.268  The anger and sense of betrayal from Republicans excluded from this 
process was one of the factors in Gingrich’s decision to step down as Speaker 
and retire from Congress.269 
By combining a number of bills to form a single, omnibus measure in 1998, 
lawmakers left themselves no opportunity to offer floor amendments.  The 
decision was to vote up or down, take it or leave it.  No legislator claimed to 
know the contents of the 4,000 page measure.  The very size of the bill invited 
the inclusion of projects that might not have survived in smaller bills.  
Congressman Joseph Moakley (D-Mass.) remarked: “the good news for the 
Democrats is this bill contains a lot more Democratic provisions than we could 
have gotten under the regular legislative procedure if that legislative procedure 
had taken place in its orderly fashion.”270 
The budget process adopted in 1974 is highly complex and has grown more 
so over the years.  The more complex the budget process, the less suitable it is 
for representative government.  Few members of Congress and their staff 
understand the arcane procedures and rules.  The general public cannot follow 
them.  That is a high price in a democratic society, where taxpayers and citizens 
should be able to monitor spending decisions. 
Congress is often criticized for being “decentralized” and “fragmented.”  In 
fact, that is a major source of strength and explains why Congress remains 
effective in protecting legislative prerogatives.  Committees and subcommittees 
play a vital role in checking the executive branch. 
In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court struck down what had come to be 
known as the “legislative veto”: efforts by Congress to control the executive 
branch by resolutions (one-House or two-House) that did not go to the President 
for his signature.  The Court said that whenever congressional action has the 
“purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations” of persons 
outside the legislative branch, Congress must act through both Houses in a bill 
presented to the President.271  The breadth of this ruling would have invalidated 
every type of legislative control, including committee and subcommittee vetoes. 
Following the Court’s ruling, Congress amended a number of statutes by 
deleting legislative vetoes and replacing them with joint resolutions (which do go 
to the President).272  Yet Congress continues to add committee vetoes to bills and 
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Presidents continue to sign them into law.  In the years following Chadha, 
Congress enacted over four hundred of these statutory provisions.  When 
committee-veto provisions came to President Reagan in 1984, he signed the bills 
but announced that he would implement the statutes “in a manner consistent with 
the Chadha decision.”273  The clear implication: committee vetoes would have 
no legal effect.  After notifying the committees, agencies could do as they liked 
without obtaining committee approval. 
The House Appropriations Committee lost little time in responding to this 
presidential threat.  It reviewed a procedure that had worked well with the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for about four years.  
Statutory ceilings (“caps”) were placed on various NASA programs, usually at 
the level requested in the President’s budget.  NASA could exceed those caps 
only if it received permission from the Appropriations Committees.  Because the 
administration now threatened to ignore the committee controls, the House 
Appropriations Committee said that it would repeal both the committee veto and 
NASA’s authority to exceed the caps.274  If NASA wanted to spend more than 
the caps allowed, it would have to do what the Court mandated in Chadha: pass 
a bill through both Houses and have it presented to the President. 
NASA was aghast.  It did not want to obtain a new public law every time it 
needed to exceed spending caps.  To avoid that kind of administrative rigidity, 
NASA Administrator James M. Beggs wrote to the Appropriations Committees 
and suggested a compromise.  Instead of putting the caps in a public law, he 
recommended that they be placed in a conference report that explains how 
Congress expects a public law to be carried out.  He then pledged that NASA 
would not exceed any ceiling identified in the conference report without first 
obtaining the prior approval of the Appropriations Committees.275  Imaginative 
remedies like this allow government to function.  For the most part, agencies find 
it in their interests to adhere closely to nonstatutory controls. 
Members of Congress need to reeducate themselves on their institutional 
duties and constitutional prerogatives.  They would then be in a position to 
educate their constituents and promote a healthy system of checks and balances.  
Presidents should not be allowed to engage the country in war singlehandedly. 
Congress should not transfer item-veto powers to the President.  If legislators fail 
to take the lead, citizens can challenge them at town-hall meetings and remind 
lawmakers of their constitutional duties. 
Over the past decade I have advised a number of countries from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.  I worked with 
legislators, executive officials, judges, and constitutional experts from Albania, 
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Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  
What impressed them (with their history of executive dominance) was the 
capacity of Congress to participate as a coequal branch and provide effective 
checks on the President.  They saw the value of a vigorous system of checks 
and balances.  So should we.  The framers knew what monarchy looked like 
and rejected it.  Yet especially in matters of the war power, the United States is 
recreating a system of monarchy (or autocracy) while it professes to champion 
democracy and the rule of law abroad.  When Presidents act unilaterally to use 
military force ostensibly to further those values, they undermine democracy 
and the rule of law at home.  That is the reality.  What are we willing to do 
about it? 
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